1. The Supreme Example of Christ
   1. The Use of Objective Evidence
   2. If Jesus, God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, used objective evidence to validate His claims, a fortiori, how much more so for you and me!
      1. Mark 2:1-5-12
      2. John 2:18-21
      3. John 10:30-31-32-33, 37-38
      4. John 15:24-25
      5. John 20:24-29
   3. The Use of Reason (Argumentation)
      1. Matthew 12:24-30
         1. Argument from analogy (vv. 25-26)
         2. The law of logical or rational inference (v. 26)
         3. Reductio ad absurdum (vv. 25-26)
         4. Argument from analogy (v. 27)
         5. The law of logical or rational inference (vv. 28, 29)
         6. Argument from analogy (v. 29)
         7. The law of contradiction (v. 30)
         8. The law of excluded middle (v. 30)
2. The Apostles
   1. The Use of Objective Evidence:
      1. Peter: Acts 2:14-32-39; 3:6-16; 4:8-14-20
      2. Paul: Acts 26:26; 1 Corinthians 15:1-8
      3. The Appeal to Objective Eyewitness Testimony:Luke 1:2-4; John 1:14; 19:35-36; 20:24, 30-31; Acts 1:1-3; 3:6-16; 4:8-14-20; 9:3-8, 17;
         22:6-9; 14; 26:12-18-26; 1 Corinthians 15:1-8; 2 Peter 1:16; 1 John 1:1-3, and so forth
   2. The Use of Reason–Rationality:
      1. Paul: Acts 17:2-3, 11, 17, 22-31; 18:4, 19; 19:8-9; 26:25; 1 Timothy 6:20
      2. Apollos: Acts 18:27-28. Note: commended by God!
      3. Dialegomai is the Greek word used in the above passages.
      4. Dialegomai: to argue, dispute, or reason. BAG: “discuss, conduct a discussion…of lectures which were likely to end in disputations….” Vine’s: “`to think different things with oneself, to ponder’; then, with other persons, `to converse, argue, dispute’”… “`to dispute with others…’” (see Acts 17:2, 17; 18:4, 19; 19:8-9; Jude 9).
      5. Like Considering or Weighing the Evidence of the Worth of One Truck against Another: Feature by Feature (4 vs 5 Speed, Horsepower, Seats, Stereo, Dollar Per Dollar)
3. The Value of the GOD Given Mind
   1. Isaiah 1:18; Mark 12:29-31; Acts 26:25
   2. We are created in the imago Dei–the image of God. This includes, among other attributes, the ability to reason.
   3. Thus, this entails the value of evidence and reason. As Charles Hodge informs us:”If the contents of the Bible did not correspond with the truths which God has revealed in his external works and the constitution of our nature, it could not be received as coming from Him, for God cannot contradict himself. Nothing, therefore, can be more derogatory to the Bible than the assertion that its doctrines are contrary to reason. The assumption that reason and faith are incompatible; that we must become irrational in order to become believers is, however it may be intended, the language of infidelity; for faith in the irrational is of necessity itself irrational….We can believe only what we know, i.e., what we intelligently apprehend.”¹
4. Uses of Logic/Reason
   1. Ministerial Use of Reason. This is the use of logic/reason as a servant or “handmaid” to the Bible and theology. Logic/reason is not put on par with or above the Bible, but stands in a subordinate role to God’s revelation. This is the role of reason that I am advocating.
   2. Magisterial Use of Reason. This is the placing of logic/reason on par with or actually above the Bible. Here logic/reason (that of the individual or a group) is allegedly the final judge, arbitrator, or authority of truth. This is not the role of reason that I am  advocating. This is an incorrect use–abuse–of reason.
   3. Anti-Intellectual. This is the position of depreciating or out-right denying the role of reason/logic in apologetics and other concerns of Christianity. Unfortunately, this is the view that many Christians, intentionally or not, advocate.
5. God gave us a mind and He expects us to use it (Mark 12:29-31)
   1. It is not true that the mind is a terrible thing, “so waste it.”
   2. The emotional nature of mankind is just as fallen as the intellect. Thus, we should not exalt it relating to conversion either.
   3. If we are going to glorify God as Christians and in sharing the Gospel with others,  we must not ignore or in an unscriptural manner down-play the importance of the mind in the preaching of the Gospel.
   4. This is in actuality a form of false humility or false spirituality, and should be denounced for what it is–unscriptural and dishonoring to God!
6. Logic Defined
   1. Before we proceed any further, we should define the term logic.
      1. “Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning.”²
      2. It is the study of the laws or principles of thought or reason, that is not just mere thought or thinking per se, but of the type of thought or thinking we term reasoning. Irving Copi states that “The distinction between correct and incorrect reasoning is the central problem with which logic deals.”³
      3. Norman Geisler and Ronald Brooks tell us that “Logic is the study of right reason or valid inferences and the attending fallacies, formal and informal“⁴ (emphasis in original).
7. The Nature and Necessity of Logic. Logic is undeniable, unavoidable, self-evident, or self-explanatory. One cannot not use it. One has to use it to refute it. All such claims are self-contradictory defeating, refuting, or self-stultifying. The four laws or principles of logic/reason are invaluable!  We need to know and correctly use logic. We must train ourselves, our children, and the church to properly use logic.
   1. The Undeniableness of Logic. For all of people’s rhetoric against logic, one cannot not use logic. It is impossible to think or engage in any type of coherent dialogue and not use logic. The laws or principles of logic are what are termed first principles–first principles of epistemology. Logic is indispensable for at least five reasons.
      1. The primary principles or laws of logic/reason are first principles of epistemology.
         1. Peter Angeles states, among other things, that first principles are “Statements (laws, reasons, rules) that are self-evident and/or fundamental to the explanation of a system and upon which the system depends for consistency and coherence.”⁵
         2. That is, there is no getting “behind” or “around them.”
         3. They are axiomatic or self-evident.
         4. That is, we cannot not use them (see points 2 and 3).
      2. Second, the very distinction between true or false or applicable or not only exists or has meaning if logic is true or applicable. Without logic (e.g., the law of non-contradiction) there would be no such thing or concept of true or false. Thus, there could be no true or false statements in the first place, such as logic is not true or it is false that it is applicable to a given topic. This is because the law of (non-)contradiction “…itself draws the line between true and false. So we can’t call it false without assuming that it is true (Geisler and Brooks, 16)” The same holds true with the other laws of logic. As Geisler and Brooks tell us:Logic is built on four undeniable laws. There is no “getting behind” these laws to explain them. They are self-evident and self-explanatory. There is also no way around them. In order to reject any of these statements, one must assume the very principle he seeks to deny. But if you must assume that something is true to say that it is false, you  haven’t got a very good case, have you?For example, the law of non-contradiction (A is not non-A) says that no two contradictory statements can both be true at the same time and in the same sense. Now, if someone tried to deny this and said, “The law of non-contradiction is false,” he would have a problem. Without the law of noncontradiction, there is no such thing as true or false, because this law itself draws the line between true and false. So we can’t call it false without assuming that it is true. The same thing happens when someone tries to deny the other laws: the law of identity (A is A), the law of excluded middle (either A or non-A), and the law of rational inference (emphasis in original).⁶
      3. Third, furthermore, a statement’s meaningfulness (let alone significance or truthfulness) depends upon logic. If logic is not true, or applicable to the topic at hand then the statement is meaningless. A statements very meaning or meaningfulness exists only because logic is true or applicable. Otherwise the statement could or would be both true and not true or applicable and not applicable, since it would no longer be true that statements can not be both true and not true (false) in the same time and sense. Both are now true or applicable since a statement can be both true and not true (false) at the same time and in the same sense. Thus, one could just as well say that “logic is true or applicable to the topic at hand” in the same breath as the previous statement, or “I will see you Wednesday and I will not see you Wednesday,” etc. Thus, to deny logic or state that it is not true or applicable only has meaning if logic does apply to the original statement. But this refutes the original claim. Thus, any statement or claim only have meaning, a fortiori significance or truthfulness, if and only if logic does apply or is true. Thus, the claim that “logic is not true or applicable” is meaningless unless logic is true, but in that case the original claim is false, indeed, self-defeating.
      4. Fourth, to deny or try to disprove the need for, necessity of, or truth of logic one must first utilize it, thus disproving their original assertion. One has to use logic to try to disprove, refute, or even deny it. If one must use logic in the effort to refute it, then the argument is self-evidently not true. One has only proven its truthfulness or applicability (ironically in the very attempt to refute it).
         1. To deny logic or say that it is false or not true or applicable to a certain topic entails the use of logic in the very assertion itself (thus, it is true or applicable). This is like a person who says, “I can not utter a word in English.” But, they just did. They should either quit speaking English or retract the original statement. The original statement is false, indeed self-defeating.
         2. Further examples of these types of claims:
            1. “Logic is not applicable to this topic.”
            2. “This topic, view, or realm is `beyond’ logic.” The idea is that logic’s reach simply does not extend to the topic.
            3. “This is just a case of the Eastern versus Western or Aristotelian bias or perspective on logic.” The idea is that one is insisting on a Western worldview perspective, while ignoring or to the detriment of an Eastern or occultic view.
            4. “This is the mundane versus `spiritual’ perspective.”
            5. “This is merely the emotions versus the realm of rationality or logic.”
            6. “This is the altered versus normal states of consciousness viewpoint.”
            7. “This is a case of this plane versus other planes or levels of reality or existence.”
            8. “This is only a case of this level versus other levels of meaning.”
            9. “Logic is not true.”
            10. This is a modern versus a postmodern perspective.
            11. All these claims are based upon logic in the first place.
         3. Logic is undeniable; one cannot not use it.
         4. Thus, to deny logic or assert that logic is not true (i.e., false) or applicable is itself based upon logic. The statement or distinction itself is built or predicated upon logic. Logic had to be employed to formulate the assertion. The statement “logic does not apply” involves the distinction of “logic does not apply,” versus “logic does apply.” However, it is possible to make this distinction itself only because of the laws of logic. Therefore, logic is–must be–true or does apply. But, this is self-refuting or refutes the original claim.
      5. Fifth, one cannot not use logic in the real world. Try driving to the grocery store while denying the validity of logic. (Indeed, what grocery store? The one that is and is not there?) One can not successfully cross the railroad tracks without it. Next time you’re at the railroad crossing with an apparent train speeding down the line imagine thinking that the train is there and it is not there. Would you? No! Try this in the “real” world. Logic is necessary or indispensable in or for life. One literally can not live (long) without it!
         1. Example: Francis Schaeffer, the Hindu student, and the teapot….
         2. Example: The Christian Scientist who tries to hand you a book that is not there….
         3. Example: the Hindu or Christian Scientist who looks both ways before crossing the street….Why do they look both ways before crossing the street?
   2. Self-Refuting
      1. All attempts to deny or refute logic fail. They are false (indeed, are meaningless or nonsensical), self-contradictory, or self-stultifying assertions.
      2. Terms for a statement or proposition that does not fulfill or satisfy itself–its own criteria or requirements (of acceptability)⁷ include: self-defeating, self-refuting, self-stultifying, self-referential absurdity or self-referentially absurd.
         Examples of self-refuting claims include:
         1. A person saying “I do and do not believe in logic” or “logic is and is not true” (at the same time and in the same sense).
         2. A person “saying I am and am not an atheist.”
         3. A person who claims that they “do and do not hold to postmodernism” or “do and do not believe that postmodernism is true.”
         4. A person saying “I am and am not a New Ager” or “I am and am not a neopagan.
         5. A person saying “I am and am not a Christian.”
         6. A person saying “Jesus is and is not God” (the second person of the Trinity).
      3. The previous absurd claims are logically and ontologically equivalent to the following ones:
         1. A person who believes in “square circles.”
         2. A person writing “I cannot write a word in English.”
         3. A person saying “all the statements I make are false.”
         4. A person claiming that “all sentences that contain over five words are false.”
         5. A person stating that “I will only believe what can be proved by the scientific method!”
         6. A person saying “my brother is an only child.”
      4. Ronald Nash notes: “…a denial of logic has consequences not only for epistemology and metaphysics, but for ethics as well. If all predications are true, there is no difference between walking to a nearby city and walking over a cliff; there is no difference between drinking milk and imbibing arsenic. But obviously there is a difference.”⁸
      5. Thus, if logic is not true or transculturally applicable then now A can be non-A at the same time and in the same sense and hence, for example, the postmodern’s position is now the same as the orthodox Christian’s. Or, the postmodernist does not hold to postmodernism. But, even the postmodernist does believe this. They, in this case rightly, would assert, that their view is not our view–that is why we would be having a discussion with them in the first place. Nor would they affirm that they do and do not hold to the premises of postmodernism. This is absurd, but this is what follows if one denies the universal applicability and truthfulness of logic. By God’s grace, we must try and help the postmodernist and others who deny the universal validity of logic see the implications of their views.
   3. Logic is the straitjacket of life for those who argue insanely or, at least mentally, refuse to live in the real world!
   4. One can not even cross the street, let alone the metaphysical highway without using logic.
   5. Logic is indispensable–period. Moreover, it is an invaluable tool for dismantling non-Christian views. We must know logic and become competent in using it.
   6. The Three Cs of Logic:We cannot comprehend, let alone confirm, let alone conform our thoughts and lives to God’s revelation without the use of Logic.
      1. Comprehension (or to Apprehend)If a person can not apprehend the content of the Gospel, then certainly they can not
         understand it, and a fortiori they can not believe in it!
         1. Illogical or self-contradictory statements and beliefs are incomprehensible in the sense that they are nonsensical. Nonsensical assertion are not to be believed, whether religious or “secular.” They are to be seen and rejected for what they are–nonsense.
         2. It follows therefore that reason and logic are necessary for intelligible and reasonable propositions, which are a necessary precondition for the communication of truth to individuals. Truth must be logical so as to presented to a person’s mind as intelligible thoughts, so that they might be embraced or rejected. As Charles Hodge so precisely stated it: In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation. Revelation is the communication of truth to the mind. But the communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelation cannot be made to brutes or idiots. Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually apprehended…The first and indispensable office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition, or
            intelligent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception.⁹
      2. Confirmation:
         1. Since God does not contradict Himself, or ask us to believe contradictions or that which is inherently self-contradictory (see e.g., 1 Tim. 6:20), revelations from Him will not contradict previously given revelations, or the sound reasoning processes necessary to even comprehend these revelations. Hodge informs us: “If the contents of the Bible did not correspond with the truths which God has revealed in his external works and the constitution of our nature, it could not be received as coming from Him, for God cannot contradict himself. Nothing, therefore, can be more derogatory to the Bible than the assertion that its doctrines are contrary to reason. The assumption
            that reason and faith are incompatible; that we must become irrational in order to become believers is, however it may be intended, the language of infidelity; for faith in the irrational is of necessity itself irrational….We can believe only what we know, i.e., what we intelligently apprehend.”¹⁰
         2. Thus, in one sense, reason is accorded the purgative to judge the trustworthiness of an alleged revelation. That is, before an alleged revelation from God should be accepted, we need to first discern that it is in fact from Him. Again, Hodge has written definitively on the topic:It is impossible that He should require us to believe what contradicts any of the laws of belief which He has impressed upon our nature [i.e., the laws of thought or logic¹¹]…Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time….The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is confidence in God. We can neither believe or know anything unless we confide in those laws of belief which God implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken up. All distinction between right and wrong, would disappear…and we should become the victims of every adroit deceiver, or minister of Satan, who, by lying wonders, should call upon us to believe a lie.¹²
         3. It should be evident that faith is inherently reasonable. Its very nature demands such.¹³ Moreover, since faith in Christ is self-commitment to the truth, necessarily, its content or what is believed corresponds to reality, as well as is consistent or non-contradictory.
            Thus, it fulfills the requirements of the two primary truth tests (the correspondence and coherence theories of truth). Remember, we are told that we are saved because we believe the truth (see e.g., John 18:37; 2 Th. 2:13), and that conversely those who will not believe the truth are lost (see e.g., 2 Th. 2:10-11).
      3. Conform: We are to conform our thoughts and lives to God’s revelation. But we cannot do this without the use of logic. For example, we cannot say that “Christ is both God and not God” or that “we are and are not to sin.”
   7. Christian Thinkers Addressing the Biblical Position Regarding Logic
      1. A number of influential Christian thinkers have well summarized the biblical teaching regarding logic. I would like to quote some of them (in addition to the previous quotes from Charles Hodge) for further conformation.
      2. For instance, Carl F.H. Henry remarks: “…Scripture affirms that God is the source and ground of reason and truth and that the imago Dei in which He created and preserves humanity includes rational and moral capacities.”¹⁴ Henry also insightfully writes: The laws of logic are not a speculative prejudice imposed at a given moment of history as a transient philosophical development. Neither do they involve a Western way of thinking, even if Aristotle may have stated them in an orderly way. The laws of valid inference are universal; they are elements of the imago Dei. In the Bible, reason has ontological significance. God is Himself truth and the source of truth. Biblical Christianity honors  the Logos of God as the source of all meaning and considers the laws of thought an aspect of the imago….The pluralistic approach to world religions now often champions the need to recast the gospel in other than “Western thought forms” and in non-Western “logics,” as if logic were an Aristotelian invention. Such emphases often relativize Christian theology and replace it with non-Biblical philosophy under the guise of Christian mission.¹⁵
      3. R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley likewise note: “Biblically the contradiction is the hallmark of the lie. Without this formal test of falsification, the Scriptures (and any other writings) would have no means to distinguish between truth and falsehood, righteousness and unrighteousness, obedience and disobedience, Christ and Antichrist.”¹⁶ Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley also rightly state (contra post-modernism): “The law of noncontradiction as a necessary presupposition or prerequisite for thought and life is neither arbitrary nor subjectivistic. It is universal and objective. What is subjective and arbitrary is the forced and temporary denial of it.”¹⁷
      4. Arthur Holmes responds: “…the law of noncontradiction is a universal condition of intelligible thought. Aristotle’s famous `negative proof’ shows this by asking that one who denies the law practice his denial in speaking. Unintelligible utterances may be possible without it, like talk of a square circle, but unintelligible utterances hardly qualify as intelligible thought or speech. Where this law of logic is ignored, all logic and intelligibility are gone.”¹⁸ Holmes also remarks: “Thinking is subject to logical laws, for I cannot contradict myself and talk sense, yet alone construct a valid line of argument. Good logic is one of God’s good gifts, and it is essential to thinking in this and any world.”¹⁹
      5. Lastly, we note the view of Augustine: “The true nature of logical conclusions has not been arranged by men; rather they studied and took notice of it so that they might be able to learn or to teach it. It is perpetual in the order of things and divinely ordained.”²⁰
8. The Four Primary Laws of Logic.  While many people talk about logic (and often as if they could do without), at least the five letter word in English, logic, however not very many really know or understand what logic is, or what are termed by some, the four primary principles or laws of logic. Thus, to help us comprehend and better understand the nature and necessity of logic I want to at least briefly examine the four primary principles or laws of logic.
   1. The Law of (non-)Contradiction
      1. The first of the primary principles of logic is the law of (non-)contradiction. It states that no statement (proposition, assertion, etc.) can be both true and not true–false–(e.g., A can not be non-A) at the same time and in the same sense.
         For example, it cannot both be true and not true (in the same time and sense) that a person is and is not a Christian. All such statements are false.
      2. Thus, any statement or proposition that asserts that it is (both) true and not true (false) at the same time and in the same sense is itself false. A cannot be non-A at the same time and in the exact same sense; or any statement that states A is not-A (or p &~p) at the same time and in the same sense is false.
         1. It is a first (or self-evident) principle of thought or epistemology. One has to use it to refute it.
         2. To deny it is like saying “I cannot utter a word in English.”
         3. One cannot not use it (logically or ontologically).
         4. The distinction between it applying to a statement, view, person, or group and not applying to them is itself based on this law.
         5. All statements are meaningless unless the law is true.
         6. The distinction between true and false is based on this principle.
         7. Practically speaking, one cannot live in the real world without it. Try crossing the street while denying it (e.g., the Mack truck that is there and is not there!).
   2. The Law of Excluded Middle
      1. The second primary law of logic is the principle of excluded middle.
      2. The law of (non-)contradiction simply states that A cannot equal non-A (or p & non-p) at the same time and in the same sense. But both could be, say, “quip,” that is, neither true or false–simply not both–but not necessarily true or false.
      3. But, the law of excluded middle states “A or non-A,” that is, a proposition or statement is either true or false–it must be one or the other (and not quip)!
         Thus, a proposition or statement must be true or false.
      4. Example: Matthew 12:30
   3. The Law of Identity
      1. The third primary law of logic is called the law of identity.
      2. It states that A=A or that “if any statement is true, then it is true.”²¹
      3. Example: Christ is Christ (and not non-Christ)
      4. Importance: Sound Doctrine Versus the Cults/Occult: Christ is Christ (i.e., the Christ of the Bible: fully divine–God the Son, the second person of the Trinity–and fully human) and not non-Christ (e.g., the Christ of the Bible is not the  “Christ[s]” of the cults and/or the occult).
      5. Thus, we can see the importance of the law of identity.
      6. While this law should seem very obvious, and not even have to be mentioned because it is so obvious, nonetheless, this basic law of logic is often violated (e.g., by people committing what is called the four-term fallacy or by other equivocation fallacies).
   4. The Law of Logical or Rational Inference
      1. The fourth primary law of logic is the law of logical or rational inference.
      2. An example of it or one way it is expressed is: “if A=B, and B=C, then A=C.”
      3. Importance: All Discursive or non-Axiomatic Knowledge
      4. Key Example: The Trinity
         1. While the word Trinity (from Latin) is not found in the Bible, the concept clearly is!
         2. See, for example, Deuteronomy 6:4; Ephesians 1:3; John 1:1; 20:28; Acts 5:3-4; and Mark 12:29-30.
         3. Also see John 2:19-21; Romans 8:11; 1 Peter 3:18; 1 Thessalonians 1:10; and Acts 2:24, 32; 4:10 and 17:30-31.
   5. These four primary laws of logic are the essence of logic and are vital to all coherent or intelligible discussions or arguments. Try as one may one cannot–in any intelligent sense–not use them (e.g., even when trying to argue against the laws of logic).
9. Examples of the Importance of Logic (and Not Being Illogical)
   1. The Reductio ad Absurdum Technique
      1. John 1:1-3
      2. Philippians 2:5-11
   2. Equivocation Fallacies: This is the use of a word (term) or phrase with two or more different meanings.
      1. Example: Read Jesus Daily:
      2. Example: Jesus is Triune:
      3. Example: The Skeptical Skeptics:
10. Examples of Self-Refuting Claims
    1. Charles Kraft: Culturally Conditioned Conclusions
       1. Charles Kraft comments: …there is always a difference between reality and human culturally conditioned understandings (models) of that reality. We assume that there is a reality “out there” but it is the mental constructs (models) of that
          reality inside our head that are the most real to us. God, the author of reality, exists outside any culture. Human beings, on the other hand, are always bound by cultural, subcultural (including disciplinary), and psychological conditioning to perceive and interpret what they see of reality in ways appropriate to these conditionings. Neither the absolute God nor the reality [God] created is perceived absolutely by culture-bound human beings.²²
       2. If we take Kraft’s claims seriously, then they would also apply to his own understanding(s) of reality, which is culturally conditioned. Thus, why should we listen to him? His views here are self-refuting.
    2. The Verification Principle
       1. What is by now fairly well-known, but is nonetheless a classic example of a self-referentially refuting claim, is the so-called verification principle of the philosophical logical positivist movement which was held to by many leading intellectuals of this century. As Carl F.H. Henry succinctly states it: “Logical positivists postulate that only premises verifiable by sense data can be meaningful or true. But in that case this very premise–itself empirically unverifiable–cannot be considered meaningful or true.”²³ Thus came about the eventual discarding of the verification principle.
    3. W.V.O. Quine: “[N]o statement is immune to revision.”
       1. The famous philosopher of science, W.V.O. Quine, with his theory of “pragmatic holism” claimed that “no statement is immune to revision.” However, if this statement is true then it too is not immune to or from revision. One revision of it is that “some statements are immune to revision.” But, this contradicts the original claim of Quine. Quine’s claim is self-refuting.
    4. Larry Laudan’s Nonself-correcting Views
       1. Larry Laudan, author of among other works, Progress and Its Problems and Science and Values espouses a number of self-refuting ideas. For instance, Laudan claims that Charles Sanders Peirce’s view that science is self-correcting is “simply incorrect” and uses examples from the history of science in an attempt to prove that Peirce is wrong.²⁴ However, Laudan has stated that: “Determinations of truth and falsity are irrelevant to the acceptability or the pursuitability of [scientific] theories and research traditions.”²⁴ But, based on his own theory, Laudan blatantly contradicts himself. That is, if the issue of truth or falseness is irrelevant to scientific theories, then according to Laudan’s own theory, Peirce cannot be “simply incorrect,” nor can any of the other individuals or theories that Laudan corrects be incorrect.²⁶ In fact, much of Laudan’s writings are “correcting” what he sees as incorrect or (dare I say it?) false
          scientific theories. Thus, some of Laudan’s key views are self-refuting.
    5. William Lane Craig shares an insightful instance of self-refuting claims:Or consider the claim that “God cannot be described by propositions governed by the Law of Contradiction.” If this proposition is true, then, since it describes God, it is not itself governed by the Law of Contradiction. Therefore, it is equally true that “God can be described by propositions governed by the Law of Contradiction.” But then which propositions are these? There must be some, for the Eastern mystic is committed
       to the truth of this claim. But if he produces any, then they immediately refute his original claim that there are no such propositions. His claim thus commits him to the existence of counterexamples which serve to refute that very claim….²⁷
    6. Some of the views of B.F. Skinner, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Feuerbach, and many other well-known thinkers are self-refuting.
11. Other Fun Fallacies
    1. Aidan Kelly: “all truths are merely metaphors.”
       1. The previous statement is a believed truth (or Kelly would not have stated it). Is it only or merely a metaphor? That is, it is not to be understood literally. Therefore, it is not literally true that “all truths are merely metaphors”? But, this
          contracts the original assertion.
       2. Is Kelly’s claim to be understood metaphorically, non-metaphorically, or both, or neither?
          1. If it is only metaphorically true, then it is not literally true that “all truths are merely metaphors.” Therefore the statement is false. Worse yet it is self-defeating, indeed, nonsensical.
          2. If it is non-metaphorically (literally) true, then the statement itself is merely a metaphor. Therefore, it is not literally true that “all truths are merely metaphors.” Thus, again, the statement is false.
          3. To say it was both metaphorically and non-metaphorically true (I present this option not because it is really possible, but some Neo-pagans think so), it would still be false, in fact, self-refuting.
          4. Just for the sake of argument, if the statement was intended neither metaphorically or non-metaphorically true then why would anyone state it?
          5. These types of claims are at best false, at worse nonsense because they are self-defeating. Aidan Kelly’s comments regarding reality result in absurdity.
    2. “All truth is relative” or “there are no absolute truths.” “There are absolutely no absolutes!”
       1. Joseph Campbell, Postmodernism, and Many Others
       2. “There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative” (Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, 25).
       3. “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter. Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes and clever in their own sight.” Isaiah 5:20-21
       4. Edgar Sheffield Brightman (a past professor of philosophy at Boston University) said “In a universe where Christianity and Christian Science are both true, we do not have a universe, but a cosmic nut-house!”
       5. Joseph Campbell:Joseph Campbell in The Power of Myth states, “…The person who thinks he has found the ultimate truth is wrong” (55). Yet he repeatedly propounds what he believes to be ultimate truth, such as his belief in an impersonal and amoral divinity. This is kind of like “He who thinks they know doesn’t.” Hum?
       6. “There is no one or ultimate truth.”Then is this statement true? How could it be? It would contradict itself. Besides if all
          truths are relative then this statement too would be relative. Thus, it would also mean that “There is one or an ultimate truth,” (at least sometimes). Ooops!
    3. Not Either OrFirst, for instance, some neo-pagans oppose either/or statements (e.g., A or not-A), preferring both/and propositions (e.g., A and not-A). An example is either Sue believes in witchcraft or she does not.
       1. However, the distinction or preference between either/or as opposed to both/and propositions is itself an either/or proposition. It is an either/or proposition which in effect says do not use either/or propositions, but do use both/and ones. Thus, people who promulgate this idea are using the very distinction they allegedly oppose.
       2. Second, if we tried to consistently apply this advice then we should and should not use either/or statements since all propositions, including “do not use either/or statements,” must be turned into both/and propositions. Therefore, we should and should not use either/or statements. Ooops!
       3. Second, two more examples come from William Dyrness in his Learning about Theology from the Third World²⁸. Dyrness remarks that: “In general, Indian thinkers point out, Western thought patterns are fundamentally dualistic [i.e., based on the law of (non-) contradiction], therefore analysis is the primary mode of critical thought. Eastern patterns favor nondualistic modes, therefore thinking tends to be synthetic.”²⁹ Dyrness proceeds to mention S.J. Samartha and his book, The Hindu Response to the Unbound Christ as an example of this. Dyrness also writes:There are those who argue that these Eastern patterns of thought are inviolable and Christianity must adapt to them completely. Jung Young Lee has argued that in Asia we must get out of the habit of thinking in terms of either/or; we must be able to think of both/and. Change, he believes, may be the key to the universe, and ambiguity and differences merely the reflection of aspects of reality. In traditional Chinese thought, yin and yang are believed to be complementary modes of being….[H]e seeks to apply this to his view of God….³⁰
    4. “All truths are half-truths.”Another example of a supposed revelatory truth which is self-defeating is quoted by Laurie Cabot: “…all truths are half-truths; everything contains its opposite; extremes meet; and every pair of opposites can be reconciled. Knowing this is the key to making the universe work for you….”
       1. If all truths are half-truths, this would include the previous statement which is an alleged truth. It too would be a half-truth. Thus, is it only half-true? Or, is it both true and false? Which half of the proposition is true?
       2. Or, is it false half of the time, but true the other half? Thus, fifty percent of the time the proposition is not true. This would entail that about fifty percent of the time all truths are not half-truths. But, this contradicts the original statement that “all truths are half-truths.”
       3. Furthermore, if “everything contains its opposite” as well as “extremes meet,” this would include the above statement. Therefore, truly, “all truths are half-truths” and “all truths are not half-truths.” Ooops!
    5. These assertions are self-contradictory, self-defeating, or self-refuting. They are nonsensical!
12. The Challenge for You and Me
    1. 1 Corinthians 10:31 (NIV)”So whether you eat or drink [or think] or whatever you do, do it all for the glory of God.”
    2. 2 Corinthians 10:3-5 (NIV)”For though we live in the world, we do not wage war as the world does. The weapons we fight with are not the weapons of the world. On the contrary, they have divine power to demolish strongholds. We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it obedient to
       Christ.”
    3. Mark 12:29-31!

ENDNOTES

Copyright ©1999 Craig S. Hawkins. All Rights Reserved.  

Justification – A Right Relationship with GOD

by Craig S. Hawkins

  “For we maintain that a man is justified by faith apart from observing the law.“  - 
Romans 3:28 NIV 

 

Doctrinal Summary

The teaching or doctrine of justification has rightly been seen by many theologians (see below)  as a central, if not the central, doctrine of Christianity. There is much to be said regarding the biblical doctrine of justification–”the justice” or “the righteousness of God” (see e.g., Rom. 1:17: dikaiosyne theou in Greek, iustitia Dei in Latin).

Among the many key words in the Greek New Testament that pertain to our topic, I want to note in particular three key terms: dikaios, dikaiosyne, and dikaioo. In the context of our discussion (among other meanings), dikaios means upright, just, or righteous.⁽¹⁾ Likewise, in the context of our study, dikaiosyne means uprightness or righteousness (e.g., Phil. 3:9).⁽²⁾ Dikaioo, in context here, means “justify, vindicate, treat as just,” and Paul’s use of it as “be acquitted, be pronounced and treated as righteous…be justified.”⁽³⁾ For example, in Romans 5:1, 9; and Titus 3:7, dikaioo occurs in the aorist, passive participle form (dikaiothentes), meaning “having been justified.” Thus, it is a past completed action with on-going effects or results that is done to or for the believer by God (i.e., passive voice–which means that the subject is the object of or receives the action–which in this case is that the believer is justified); that is, God justifies the believer in or by or because of the work of Christ. We read in BAG that “Paul … uses the word almost exclusively of God’s judgment…[especially] of men dikaiousthai[:] be acquitted, be pronounced and treated as righteous and thereby become dikaios, receive the divine gift of dikaiosyne….”⁽⁴⁾

Definition of Justification

The believer, the one who trusts in Christ Jesus as their personal Lord and Savior is not only pronounced not guilty, is not only pronounced innocent, but is pronounced righteous (positionally now and eventually practically as well) by God (see e.g., Rom. 1:17; 3:21-24). J.I. Packer states that it (dikaioo) “…is to pronounce, accept, and treat as just, i.e., as, on the one hand, not penally liable, and, on the other, entitled to all the privileges due to those who have kept the law.”⁽⁵⁾ In other words, God views the believer as if they had/have completely or perfectly obeyed the law (i.e., the Ten Commandments). Note the following five summations in particular–among the many excellent ones–of the doctrine of justification–specifically what is termed subjective justification (the latter four):

The article of justification, which is our only protection, not only against all the powers and plottings of men but also against the gates of hell, is this: by faith alone (sola fide) in Christ, without works, are we declared just (pronuntiari justos) and saved.⁽⁶⁾

As soon as a contrite sinner believes the divine promises of grace which for Christ’s sake is offered to him in the Gospel, or as soon as he puts his trust in the vicarious satisfaction which Christ has made for the sins of the world by His perfect obedience, he is justified, or declared righteous before God….Subjective justification may therefore be defined as the act of God by which He removes from the believer the sentence of condemnation to which he is subject because of his sin, releases him from his guilt, and ascribes to him the merit of Christ. Baier defines justification as “the act by which the sinner, who is responsible for guilt and liable to punishment…but who believes in Christ, is pronounced just by God, the Judge.”⁽⁷⁾

“Justification is a judicial and at the same time a gracious act by which God, reconciled by the satisfaction of Christ, acquits the sinner who believes in Christ of the offenses with which he is charged and accounts and pronounces him righteous.”⁽⁸⁾

We explain justification simply as the acceptance with which God receives us into his favor as righteous men. And we say that it consists in the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.⁽⁹⁾

…God forgives sinful individuals, counts them as righteous on the basis of their faith in Christ, and accepts them as his own reconciled children, apart from all human merit and solely because of the superabundant merit of Christ’s work of satisfaction….⁽¹⁰⁾

The Forensic Nature of Justification

Moreover, the pronouncement of “justification” or of the believer being “justified” by God is forensic.⁽¹¹⁾ That is, it is declaratory or a legal declaration by the Sovereign Judge–indeed the Supreme Court of the universe–that the believer, on the account of the finished work of Christ, is forgiven of their sins and pronounced “righteous.” J.I.Packer declares: “It [dikaioo] is thus a forensic term, denoting a judicial act of administering the law–in this case, by declaring a verdict of acquittal, and so excluding all possibility of condemnation. Justification thus settles the legal status of the person justified.”⁽¹²⁾ However, as the TDNT points out: “Forensically does not mean….moral rectitude is attained. What it does mean is that the man who has dikaiosyne is right before God.”⁽¹³⁾ (The Reformers would often say or argue that a person was not made righteous, but declared righteous by God, by the imputed grace of God and not by “infused” grace of God.) That is, positionally speaking, the believer in Christ is declared right or righteous (in a right standing and in a right relationship with God), but this does not entail that in this present life (practically speaking), in their daily living, that they always act righteous–do not commit sins of commission or omission.

Additionally, and related to the previous point, according to the Protestant Reformation (I would argue biblical) view(s) this righteousness is said to be alien or external and objective since it is imputed or given to the believer by God because of the work of Christ. That is, this righteousness is not inherent to or from the individual, but is given to them from God. Thus, it is alien (Luther’s term) or external–it is not or did not come from within the individual, but from God; hence, it is external to the individual. Another way to say it is that this righteousness is not subjective or inherent to the individual, or a result of their working or working with or cooperating with God for salvation. Thus, “[o]ur righteousness is wholly and solely that of Christ, imputed to us; we contribute nothing.”⁽¹⁴⁾

Justification is Not because of Our Works

Throughout church history there have been discussions, disagreements, and debates about the nature of justification,⁽¹⁵⁾ for example, about the role and relationship of good works to or for salvation. Nonetheless, evangelical and orthodox Christians have been united on the above mentioned points.

Some individuals have tried to argue that good works are necessary for salvation in the sense that one needs to cooperate with God in salvation, and their part is the good works. For instance, some people have taught the idea that James (chapter 2) contradicts the Pauline teaching regarding the role and relationship of justification and faith and works (e.g, Rom. 4 and 5), and that James proves that works are part of salvation in the sense that we must cooperate with God by our good works to be declared righteous by Him. However, the Bible does not teach in James or elsewhere that we must earn or in some other way “cooperate” with God for our salvation (i.e., to be declared righteous by God). These types of claims have been thoroughly answered.⁽¹⁶⁾ Indeed, in summing-up the biblical view of Paul and James on justification and noting the views of Luther, Calvin, and Cranmer, Geoffrey Bromiley remarks: “True faith manifest itself in good works. Absence of the latter denotes absence of the former.”⁽¹⁷⁾ This distinction is between a true or genuine or saving faith and a “false faith,” and not between a genuine saving faith and works (See the previous footnote for more complete argumentation of this point). A true or saving faith always will produce good works, but the works do not save or justify the person. The works are evidence that the person possess saving faith or already is justified.

Given the points mentioned in the previously sections and the ones to follow, we see that the believer is justified because of the finished work of Christ and not because of any good works that they do or have done to earn this standing with God. For example, Paul teaches very clearly that no one is saved or justified by works (see, e.g., Rom. 3:27-28; 4:1-11; 9:30-32; Gal. 2:15-16, 21; 5:4).

Of the many passages cited and many others that could be mentioned, I will just quickly examine Romans 3:28. In Romans 3:28 Paul declares that “For we maintain that a man is justified by faith apart from observing the law” (NIV). The phrase “observing the law” is an idiom for the Old Testament law, for instance, the Ten Commandments. The English word “apart” is the Greek preposition choris. In the context of Romans 3:28 (and 4:6) choris means “without or apart from” or “without relation to or connection with someth[ing]…independent of someth[ing].”⁽¹⁸⁾ In this case the something is “without regard to the observance of the law….”⁽¹⁹⁾ Thus, we are declared righteous by God without, or independent of, or separate from our obeying the law, that is, any good works. The biblical teaching here is clear.

Faith and Justification

Another point of misunderstanding that some have is regarding the role and relationship of faith to justification. It is not our faith or the faith of the individual believer that justifies, but God who justifies by grace through faith.⁽²⁰⁾ That is, faith is what is called the instrumental means or cause of salvation, not what is termed the efficient cause. As J.I. Packer rightly remarks: “Paul says that believers are justified dia pisteos (Rom. 3:25), pistei (Rom. 3:28), and ek pisteos (Rom. 3:30). The dative and the preposition dia represent faith as the instrumental means whereby Christ and his righteousness are appropriated; the preposition ek shows that faith occasions, and logically precedes, our personal justification. That believers are justified dia pistin, on account of faith, Paul never says, and would deny.”⁽²¹⁾ Packer also remarks: “faith is…personal trust and confidence in God’s mercy through Christ; that it is not a meritorious work, one facet of human righteousness, but rather an appropriating instrument, an empty hand outstretched to receive the free gift of God’s righteousness in Christ….”⁽²²⁾ B.B. Warfield notes:

It is, accordingly, solely from its object that faith derives its value. This object is uniformly the God of grace….Jesus Christ, God the Redeemer, is accordingly the one object of saving faith….The saving power of faith resides thus not in itself, but in the Almighty Saviour on whom it rests…It is not faith that saves, but faith in Jesus Christ…faith in any other saviour…brings not salvation but a curse. It is not, strictly speaking, even faith in Christ that saves, but Christ that saves through faith. The saving power resides exclusively, not in the act of faith or the attitude of faith or the nature of faith, but in the object of faith….⁽²³⁾

Alister McGrath states: the reformers’ in “…faith as the sole instrument of justification. In justification, we receive by faith the effects of the work of Christ on our behalf, appropriating it and making it our own.”⁽²⁴⁾ McGrath also comments: “The objective basis of our justification is the person and work of Jesus Christ, and the means by which we appropriate this justification and make it our own is faith. To repeat: justification by faith does not mean that we are justified on account of our faith, but that we are justified on account of Christ through the grace of God.”⁽²⁵⁾

Thus, faith, which is itself a gift from God in the first place, is the instrumental cause; it is not what justifies or saves us, but it is how we appropriate what does justify or save us–God’s grace as expressed through the finished work of Jesus for us (Eph. 2:8-9). The Latin phrase per fidem propter Christum (through [or by] faith on account of Christ) rightly summarizes the biblical teaching on how we are justified and hence saved with our sins being forgiven.

Forgiveness of Our Sins

Another key aspect regarding the nature of justification is that it entails the forgiveness of the believer’s sins and their guilt before God (see e.g., Ps. 32:1; Isa. 1:18; Rom. 4:6-8; Col. 3:13). Our sin and guilt is removed from us as far as the East is from the West. This is a biblical expression used to convey this concept (Ps. 103:12).

Moreover, in the Old Testament and under the old covenant certain animals were sacrificed as offerings to cover the peoples’ sins and guilt (see, e.g., Lev. 5:16-18; 19:22). However, in the New Testament, Jesus is referred to as “the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29, 36). Jesus, by His propitiatory work on the cross, forgives our sins (John 3:16; 1 Peter 2:24). In essence, by Jesus paying the just penalty for our sins and guilt on the cross, those who trust Him as their Lord and Savior receive His righteousness imputed to them (2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9). Luther called this the “great exchange”: Jesus paid the penalty for our sins and we are credited with His righteousness.

Lastly, regarding the nature of justification I note that it is considered among many theologians (e.g., Luther, Calvin, Turretin, Mueller, Sproul) to be a, if not the, chief, crucial, or foundational doctrine of the church. For instance, J.I Packer remarks: “the doctrine of justification determines the whole character of Christianity as a religion of grace and faith….It is the heart of the gospel. Luther justly termed it articulus stantis vel[sic: et] cadentis ecclesiae: a church that lapses from it can scarcely be called Christian.”⁽²⁶⁾ This is the great doctrine of justification (hence salvation) by grace alone through faith alone on the account of Christ alone.

Cultural Contradictions

Most if not all of our culture completely rejects the above ideas. This can be seen in many areas.

First, for example, many people in our society do not even believe that they are sinners in the first place. Thus, they do not believe that they need to be forgiven in the sense discussed above, let alone justified. These individuals would hold to the worldview perspective that people are basically good. The source(s) of difficulties in life are not from sin and being alienated from and in need of forgiveness by God, but do the failure of government or other social institutions, lack of education, and/or whatever else. Given more time and education, entertainment, government, prosperity, psychology, recreation, science, social programs and/or whatever else, these problems are sure to take care of themselves, or simply will not be seen as a problem at all (e.g., homosexuality).

Second, since many do not believe that God exists, if they believe that they need to be forgiven, then they might talk about just forgiving themselves for past failures (e.g., not realizing one’s potential), or for letting down a friend, family member, or otherwise, or not being very nice or “there for them” in some area of life or another.

Third, given the view that people or certainly most people are basically good and the incredible amount of pop-psychology and aversion of taking responsibility for one’s choice, many today generally want to blame somebody, anybody, else but themselves for the problems in their life. Many in our culture believe that they are a victim, that they are not responsible for the choices they have made. Few want to or will own their mistakes.

Fourth, some in our society who are involved in the New Age Movement, some Eastern religions, other forms of the occult, or whatever else, see any problems that they have as stemming from not realizing their alleged inherent divinity (e.g., Shirley MacLaine, Tom Cruse).

Fifth, if a person has any background in Christianity, or otherwise is willing to admit that they are a sinner, well “they’re not that bad” or “certainty not as bad as so-and-so.”

Thus, God will forgive them, especially if they do some good things to balance out or make up for the bad–have more good deeds than bad ones. Besides, even if they are “that bad,” many in our culture today assume that there are many paths, many ways, many religions whereby one can get right with God.

Sixth, and often in conjunction with the last point, people are sure that “God helps those who help themselves.” These people know that God wants them to cooperate or help-out in getting them saved. Surely, it is said, that there is something for us to do, something that we must contribute. The pride problem here is unfortunately alive and well. Full-fledged Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism are with us today. In short, many want to out-right earn their salvation by good works or at least contribute to some part of the “process.” This is a part of the “can-do” American spirit that many have: “One can do anything [even make themselves right with God] if they just set their mind to it and work hard enough.”

These items are some of the components of many people’s worldviews in our culture that contradict the biblical teaching on justification.

Church Accommodations

Unfortunately, instead of teaching the correct biblical view(s), as opposed to all the above mentioned ideas, much of the church (at least the professed church) is often going along with many of these ideas. In other words, much of the church, instead of attempting to correct these false notions, is to a greater or lesser extent simply accommodating some or many of these presuppositions of the non-Christian worldviews of our day.

First, whether this is being done out of sheer ignorance, that is, by people who just do not know the gospel and the great teaching of justification, or people who do know better, but have convinced themselves that you cannot tell people the truth because they will be offended and leave (before or after one tells them the truth?).

Second, for instance, I believe that we see this accommodation–comprise and watering-down of the gospel–in the little or complete lack of teaching in many churches regarding the biblical teaching of justification.

Third, since the church often as well as non-Christians down-plays or soft-sells sin and the effects of the fall and our sins, whether because this is really how these Christians view sin or in order not to offend anyone, their listeners don’t take sin too seriously either. Thus, “what’s the big deal?”

Fourth, intentionally or not, it seems that some churches use the real guilt that people have over their sins, and/or their desire to earn a right standing with God, to get all kinds of things done in the church. Thus, some churches can appeal to all the wrong reasons for people, Christian or not, to get involved, tithe, help out, get to work–you can and should do something–because there is much to do, so get busy, and “God will be pleased with you.” Thus, it seems to me that some parts of the church have fallen into the trap of manipulating people in the area of their guilt, pride (e.g, “You are just indispensable! What would we ever do without you?”), and so forth.

For whatever reasons, many in the church today seem to be greatly influenced by some of the worldview components of the worldly culture at large around us, and have taken a much weaker or no biblical view at all of sin, and the corresponding need to be right with God–justification, and ironically of the great blessings that derive from knowing, teaching, and possessing justification.

Change of Thinking

There are a number of very important ideas and implications from these ideas that impress themselves upon me as I have once again given serious thought to the great biblical truth of justification.

First, it reminds me of the importance of teaching the Bible and the great truths, that is, great doctrines that it reveals. These truths bring light and liberty to life. Thus, given the essential nature of the doctrine of justification relevant to the gospel–salvation, it and its implications reminds me of the freedom it brings or rather that God brings through it. I believe that justification needs to be regularly and thoroughly taught.

The teaching of justification has revolutionized my life and should do the same for everyone else. That is, since I know that through the finished work of Jesus, I am already right with God, this gives me a great desire to serve and worship Him, not out of mere fear, or the desire to get right with God or keep in His good graces, but from the basis of gratitude for who God is and what He has already done for me. It motivates me to serve and worship, and indeed to love God.

For instance, I know that I am not on some type of works righteous tread-mill that I must keep up with or that I will fall off and God will not be pleased with me. He already is pleased with me through Christ. Thus, I am not worrying about not going to heaven because I might not be good enough (in and of myself, I know that I am not good enough!). I know that God has already accepted me, that I am currently in a right relationship with God and hence am not trying to earn or keep my good standing by my works. Jesus has done it for me. I already possess eternal life (see e.g., 1 John 5:13).

If people only knew who God really is (and to be sure the mess that one is in who has not trusted in Christ as their Lord and Savior), and what He has done for us, and will do for us; I believe that this could and would revolutionize their lives and the preaching and teaching of the word of God, and church services. That God will take away our guilt and condemnation, and that one can know God’s verdict of pronouncing them righteous because of Jesus, what better news do we have than this?

In other words, and among many other points that should be made, the “gospel” is not “a take it or leave it,” or you too can begin working for God and hope that He will accept you, or other similar types of propositions. No, the gospel message, and the doctrine of justification clearly brings this out, tells us that while the news is at first hearing worst than we thought (the law, the bad news is that we are really in big trouble that we cannot get ourselves out of), it is also in the end much better than one ever thought. God has done for us what we cannot do for ourselves! Jesus has Himself paid the penalty for our sins. Thus, the news for the Christian and non-Christian is not that God has an instatement payment plan that he has started for you and He has paid in so much and you can pay in so much and you just might make it–pay it off. No! God has paid it in full! In Christ, God has given us everything. Now this is good news! This is what needs to be shared with Christians and non-Christians alike.

The biblical teaching of justification has transformed my life and I believe can and will transform the lives of other Christians and non-Christians as well. Praise be to God!

In light of the teaching of justification, Christians and the church today must reevaluate their thinking. Instead of guilt, God offers forgiveness and peace. Instead of condemnation and always trying to measure up and never being able to, God grants absolution. Instead of a works program, God pronounces “paid in full.” These aspects and more of the teaching of justification can and will transform or revolutionize the life of the believer in particular and the church in general, and the non-Christian that God grants mercy to.

Conclusion

What great news. What marvelous deeds God has done for us! Would to God that everyone would know the freedom that God grants (John 8:36). Would to God that every Christian would be taught in its fullness the great biblical teaching of justification, and understand it, and share it with others. Free indeed, freed and declared justified by the righteousness of God!

Endnotes

3. BAG, 196-97. Also see DNTT, Vol. 3, 352, 363, 370; TDNT, vol. 2, 214-19.

4. BAG, 196.

5. J.I. Packer, “Justification” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. by Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 593.

6. Martin Luther, as quoted in What Luther Says, Ewald M. Plass (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing, 1959), s.v. “2186: What is Justification?,” and “2187: Another Definition.”

7. John Theodore Mueller, Christian Dogmatics (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing, 1934) 367.

8. Hollaz, as quoted in John Theodore Mueller, Christian Dogmatics, 367.

9. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. by John T. McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), vol. 1, 3.11.2.

10. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids: Baker), s.v. iustificatio.

11. See, e.g., Millard Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983, 1984, 1985), 955-59; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., reprint (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), vol. 3, 118-134; Alister E. McGrath, Justification by Faith: What it Means to Us Today (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), 55-57; Mueller, Christian Dogmatics, 374-75; Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek, s.v. “actus forensis,” “actus iustificatorius,” “iustificatio“; J.I. Packer, “Justification,” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Walter A. Elwell, ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker), 593-94; R.C. Sproul, Faith Alone: The Evangelical Doctrine of Justification (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 95-116; and the TDNT, vol. 2, 204, 215.

12. J.I. Packer, “Justification” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 593.

13. TDNT, vol. 2, 204. See also 215.

14. Bruce Milne, Know the Truth: A Handbook of Christian Belief (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, ), 165.

15. See, e.g, Louis Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines (Edinburgh, England: Banner of Truth Trust, 1937), 203-224; Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 229-39; J.I. Packer, “Justification in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology; Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. The Beginnings to the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. From 1500 to the Present Day (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

16. See, e.g, Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines, 203-10; Bromiley, Historical Theology, 230-32, 233, 234-36; Calvin, Institutes, vol. 1, 3.11.13-15, 17-20; Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, 134-41; McGrath, Justification by Faith, 30-31; James Oliver Buswell, A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion 1 Vol. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962) 2:191-93; Mueller, Christian Dogmatics, 369-71, 376-78, 379-80; R.C. Sproul, Faith Alone, 155-171; TDNT, vol. 2, 201, 219.

17. Bromiley, Historical Theology, 235-36.

18. BAG, 899.

19. Ibid.

20. See, e.g., Berkhof, History of Christian Doctrines, 203-10; Bromiley, Historical Theology, 230-37; Calvin, Institutes, vol. 1, 3.11.19; Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, 165-70; McGrath, Justification by Faith, 66-67; Mueller, Christian Dogmatics, 376; Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek, s.v. “instrumentum iustificationis“; J.I. Packer, “Justification”, in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 596-97; Sproul, Faith Alone, 67-81.

21. J.I. Packer, “Justification” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 596.

22. J.I.Packer, “Faith” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 401.

23. B.B. Warfield, “Faith,” in Biblical and Theological Studies, Samuel Craig, ed. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968), 423-425.

24. Alister McGrath, Justification by Faith, 67.

25. Ibid.

 

 

Bibliography

Arndt, William F., Walter Bauer, and F. Wilbur Gingrich.
A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. 4th rev. and aug. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Bromiley, Geoffrey W.
Historical Theology: An Introduction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978.

Berkhof, Louis.
The History of Christian Doctrines. Edinburgh, England: Banner of Truth Trust, 1937.

Brown, Colin, ed.
“Righteousness, Justification.” In The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. Vol. 3. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978.

Buchanan, James.
The Doctrine of Justification: An Outline of Its History in the Church and of Its Exposition from Scripture. Reprint ed. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1955.

Buswell, James Oliver.
A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion. 1 Vol. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962.

Calvin, John.
Institutes of the Christian Religion. John T. McNeill, ed. Ford Lewis Battles, trans. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.

Elwell, Walter A., ed.
Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984.

_______, ed.
Topical Analysis of the Bible. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991.

Erickson, Millard.
Christian Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983, 1984, 1985.

Hodge, Charles.
Systematic Theology. 3 Vols., reprint. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979.

Ladd, George Eldon.
A Theology of the New Testament. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994.

McGrath, Alister E.
Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. The Beginnings to the Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

_______.
Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. From 1500 to the Present Day. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

_______.
Justification by Faith. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988.

Milne, Bruce.
Know the Truth: A Handbook of Christian Belief. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982.

Morris, Leon.
The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross. 3rd rev. ed. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1965.

_______.
The Atonement: Its Meaning and Significance. Downers Grove, InterVarsity Press, 1983.

Mueller, John Theodore.
Christian Dogmatics: A Handbook of Doctrinal Theology. St. Louis: Concordia, 1934, 1955.

Muller, Richard A.
Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985.

Plass, Ewald M.
What Luther Says. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing, 1959.

Schrenk, Gottlob.
“dike, dikaios, dikaiosyne, dikaioo,…” In the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Vol. 2. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964.

Sproul, R.C.
Faith Alone: The Evangelical Doctrine of Justification. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.

Tappert, Theodore G., trans. and ed.
The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959.

 

Revision Date: 10/22/98  Copyright ©1999 Craig S. Hawkins. All Rights Reserved.

 

 

This paper (1) summarizes the biblical teaching or doctrine of justification (its nature)–of the believer, and some of the problems or concerns relevant to this teaching, (2) discusses how this teaching (justification) is contradicted in the culture at large and even undermined in the church (i.e., how the church has accommodated non-Christian views), then (3) discusses the implications of the teaching of justification for us today–how it should impact believers, and (4) discusses how you and I and the church, in light of the foregoing discussion, can and should adjust our thinking (ideas) in light of this information. Due to space considerations I must limit my discussion to certain key aspects among the many that could and should be discussed in a more lengthy work on this topic. ]]> http://thecollegeoftheology.com/2009/06/justification/feed/ 0 http://thecollegeoftheology.com/2009/05/a-philosophical-critique-of-reincarnation/ http://thecollegeoftheology.com/2009/05/a-philosophical-critique-of-reincarnation/#comments Wed, 13 May 2009 07:52:26 +0000 admin http://thecollegeoftheology.com/?p=141 A Philosophical Critique of Reincarnation
and Related Worldview Correlatives

 
APOLOGETICS INFORMATION MINISTRY
Professor Craig S. Hawkins, President
P.O. Box 10375 Santa Ana, CA   92711-0375   www.apologeticsinfo.org  

 See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ.- Colossians 2:8 NIV

Introduction

The belief in reincarnation or transmigration, in one form or another, has been around for quite some time. Due to many factors, at least in the so-called Western world, these views appear to be gaining ground–a wider acceptance. Given the increasing popularity of reincarnation and/or transmigration among Westerners, I believe that there is an acute need for solid critiques of these perspectives. In particular, I think that this is an area where Christian apologists should exercise a concerted effort to accurately understand and then critique these views. Certainly this needs to be done (and has been done) from a biblical/theological perspective.⁽¹⁾ In addition to the biblical/theological critiques of reincarnation and transmigration, I strongly believe that there needs to be solid philosophical (e.g., ethical, metaphysical/ontological) evaluations as well.⁽²⁾

Reincarnation: The Answer or Part of the Problem?

Analysis

There are certain issues that will be addressed in this paper–are of a direct concern to this paper–and others that I will have to forego.

For example, there are various reasons for the popularity of reincarnation (and at that with reincarnation more so than transmigration) in the Western world. However, I do not have the space in this paper to explore in detail these factors. Besides, even if I could give an accurate account for the popularity of reincarnation in the West, this would not necessarily help us to critique it.

Moreover, as it should be inferred from some of my previous comments, this analysis will not include, per se, a biblical/theological critique. There are a number of reasons for this. First, this has already been done by a number of authors (see note 1). Second, while I believe that the Bible is the word of God and that God’s word never fails to accomplish God’s sovereign purposes (see e.g., Isa. 55:11), many do not accept what God has revealed to us and therefore has to say in the Bible. Third, among the multitude of reasons that could further be cited, since people are made in the imago Dei (see e.g., Gen. 9:6; 1 Cor. 11:7; James 3:9) and in light of general revelation (see e.g., Ps. 19:1-4; Rom. 1:19-20), I believe that we can and should also appeal to philosophical principles and critiques that logically and ontologically follow from the nature of God, the God given constitution of humans, and the world that God has created, that are either explicitly or implicitly taught in Scripture–the Bible–and therefore logically and ontologically follow from God and what He has revealed to us in the Bible.

Nor does this analysis pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of the topics under discussion. For example, a multitude of philosophical critiques can and have been given against reincarnation and transmigration then space allows me to present here (see note 2). I will have to greatly limit the scope of concerns covered in this analysis: I will have to content myself with certain ethical (e.g., some of the reincarnation theodicies) and metaphysical/ontological critiques of reincarnation.

This paper will proceed in the following order: (1) I will briefly explain part of the context in which reincarnation or transmigration appeals to people and hence the need for our analysis, (2) present and define some of the key terminology or definitions and concepts relative to reincarnation, for example, briefly comparing and contrasting reincarnation with transmigration, and then (3) expound on three critical concepts that are generally tenets of the teaching of reincarnation. This will be done in order to set the stage for the primary purpose of this paper: (4) to present philosophical critiques, primarily ethical ones and concerns relative to the problem of evil, of both reincarnation and corollary views to it.

Thus, in this paper I want to examine some of the teachings and implications of various types of reincarnationists’ views, and the philosophical implications of the world view context in which these views are found (e.g., polytheism, pantheism, panentheism). Therefore, I will examine what reincarnationists explicitly espouse, as well as what logically and ontologically follows from their views.

Reincarnationists appeal to reincarnation and the law of karma to explain the existence of most if not all of the evil and suffering that occurs in the world. Reincarnation and karma supposedly supply the answers to the difficult dilemmas of the evil and suffering that we see. I believe that this is one of the reasons why reincarnation is so popular, and increasingly so in the West. I will present extensive quotations in this paper to allow reincarnationists to speak for themselves on these concerns.

Reincarnationists believe that reincarnation, in one form or another, helps to answer most if not all of the problem(s) of evil and suffering: “Why is there so much apparent inequality, injustice, evil, and suffering in the world?” “Why do seemingly good, nice, or innocent people suffer, while others seem to be getting away with just about everything?” “Why is it that the worse things in life (e.g., tragic deaths) seem to happen to good people?” Moreover, for some of these people, no matter what they do, it seems that they cannot improve their lot in life, while others who are unethical appear to only prosper. Reincarnation is proposed as the answer, the key to these concerns, particularly the seeming injustices, inequities, and innocent suffering, and allegedly makes everything all-right in the end. But, is this really the case; is it really true? I will argue that reincarnation does not answer these dilemmas, these questions, but ironically actually causes or makes more problems or moral dilemmas. It is rather ironic that reincarnation is touted as the answer to the injustices of life and the problem of evil and suffering, when the view itself creates these very problems in the first place. Reincarnation precipitates far more many problems than it allegedly solves.

Terminology

Before I proceed in my philosophical analysis of reincarnation it is necessary to first define some, of the many relevant ones, key terms and corresponding concepts that are germane to our discussion: reincarnation, transmigration, karma, and samsara. Along with the definitions of reincarnation and transmigration, I will briefly compare and contrast them.

The first term/concept that needs to be defined is reincarnation. The term comes from the Latin (incarne: “en-flesh”), in the context of our discussion the literal meaning being “re-embodiment.” It is the belief that people live multiple times; that is, their soul or essential immaterial nature, returns multiple times to live again (i.e., rebirth into another body or alleged body). This is always (as opposed to transmigration) in the form of a human being, with a higher or lower social-economic status, greater or lesser abilities or talents, and/or with greater or lesser spiritual and/or intellectual awareness. Reincarnation is understood to work or function in a number of ways.⁽³⁾ However, what these views all have in common is the idea of entering another body (or alleged body for some Hindus) for another physical life (or alleged physical life for some Hindus). Thus, if one continues to be reincarnated, it will be as a human. This is determined by the operation of (one’s) karma.

Transmigration, our second term/concept under discussion, is basically the same view as reincarnation, except with the belief that one does not always or necessarily come back as a human, but could return as a different life form, such as a bird, bat, bug, or cow, or in the form of a so-called (for some transmigration) inanimate object, such as part of a piece of chalk, rock, wall, etc. This is determined by the operation of (one’s) karma.

The next term that needs defining is samsara. Samsara is the wheel or cycle of (re)births through which one is successively incarnated in reincarnation and transmigration. Most reincarnationists, except many neopagans, and transmigrationists want to escape or get off the wheel or cycle of reincarnation or transmigration–samsara. Whether or not one continues on the wheel or cycle of rebirths is determined by the operation of (one’s) karma.

Karma is the last term/concept, for our purposes, that needs defining. Karma comes from Sanskrit and means among other things, action, cause, destiny, or fate. It is the universal (spiritual and impersonal) law of cause and effect that governs reincarnation and transmigration. That is, for every action, choice, or event that has moral implications or ramifications, there is or are corresponding consequences–positive or negative karma. It is generally believed to be a universal law from which there is no exception to or escaping from (e.g., forgiveness or mercy from). It is often said that it must be completely balanced or “paid-off” in this life or subsequent ones. One’s karma determines his or her status in possible succeeding reincarnations or transmigrations.

With the above terms sufficiently defined, I am now in a position to proceed to the next three critical concepts that are relevant to our discussion.

Three Critical Concepts

There are three key tenets that are generally found (as corollary views) with the teachings of reincarnation and/or transmigration. Actually, the first concept contains two key elements, but for the purposes of this paper, since they are so closely related, they will be treated as one. I am not saying that all three are always found together, though they often are, but that at least one is (to the best of my knowledge) always found, and that even if only one is found this tends to cause the view in question to commit the naturalistic fallacy (see below). These three key concepts include–in no particular logical or ontological order: (1) the belief that one or their immaterial essence never ultimately dies and will always be reincarnated or transmigrated into one form or another, and that whatever happens to an individual in this life–their form and/or status–is due to the accrual of negative or positive karma, (2) the belief that one chooses (conscious or unconscious, before or during this life) to experience everything–that they do or that happens to them–in this life, and (3) the belief in the necessity to eventually experience everything or every type of experience or event or occurrence for one’s alleged intellectual/spiritual development, progression, or evolution to/towards, among other things, acquiring, developing, or realizing deity–becoming or just realizing that one is allegedly divine.

The Nature of Humanity and Karma

The first idea is that one will never cease to exist–in one form or another–and that one’s karma determines their present (and future) circumstances. Thus, for example, the circumstances of one’s life are a result of one’s accrued negative karmic debt. Closely related to the latter part of this idea is that one’s karmic debt needs to be balanced-out or “paid-off;” thus, one’s life and the circumstances thereof are orchestrated by or are the result of one’s karma and/or need to balance-out any negative karmic debt–with one’s life being the result. Put crassly the reincarnationist or transmigrationist could say “I owe, I owe, It’s off the wheel of reincarnation I go.” Many examples could be cited to illustrate these ideas.

For instance, the Bhagavad-Gita contains a prime example of this teaching. In the Bhagavad-Gita (Sanskrit for “the song of God”), one of the Hindu writings (indeed purported to be the most popular of the Hindu religious literature),⁽⁴⁾ there is an alleged dialogue between Arjuna, a warrior who is lamenting having to go into battle and kill many individuals, including some of his kinsmen, and Krishna. We read among other things the following comments and/or counsel from Krishna to Arjuna (I will quote at length so that the correct context of this passage can be seen so that, among other points, I cannot fairly be accused of misquoting or quoting it out of context.):

Your words are wise, Arjuna, but your sorrow is for nothing. The truly wise mourn neither for the living nor the dead.

There was never a time when I did not exist, nor you, nor any of these kings. Nor is there any future in which we shall cease to be.

Just as the dweller in this body passes through childhood, youth and old age, so at death he merely passes into another kind of body. The wise are not deceived by that….

That which is non-existent can never come into being, and that which is can never cease to be. Those who have known the inmost Reality know also the nature of is and is not.

That Reality which pervades the universe is indestructible. No one has power to change the Changeless.

Bodies are said to die, but That which possesses the body is eternal. It cannot be limited, or destroyed. Therefore you must fight….⁽⁵⁾

But if you should suppose this Atman [the soul, or according to the Bhagavad-Gita, the "Godhead that is within every being"⁽⁶⁾] to be subject to constant birth and death, even then you ought not to be sorry.

Death is certain for the born. Rebirth is certain for the dead. You should not grieve for what is unavoidable….

Before birth, beings are not manifest to our human senses. In the interim between birth and death, they are manifest. At death they return to the unmanifest again. What is there in all this to grieve over?….

He Who dwells within all living bodies remains for ever indestructible. Therefore, you should never mourn for any one.

…[Y]ou ought not to hesitate; for, to a warrior, there is nothing nobler than a righteous war. Happy are the warriors to whom a battle such as this comes: it opens a door to heaven….

Die, and you win heaven. Conquer, and you enjoy the earth. Stand up now, Son of Kunti, and resolve to fight. Realize that pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, are all one and the same: then go into battle. Do this and you cannot commit any sin.⁽⁷⁾

In other words, once Arjuna understands the supposed nature of reality, including transmigration, then he should realize that he can kill–at least in this case–with impunity. Not only is he not guilty of any “sin,” nor of ultimately killing anyone, but his actions are actually virtuous since he is helping others with their karma. To demonstrate that this is not just my “spin” or trying to give the text the worst possible interpretation, or that I am not taking it out of context or misinterpreting it, note the understanding/interpretations of the previously cited text by the following Hindu/New Age leaders.

Vivekananda states, “The murderer too is God.”⁽⁸⁾

Rajneesh exclaims in expounding on the Bhagavad-Gita (including the section cited above): “Even if you kill someone consciously, while fully conscious it is meditative. That is what Krishna was saying to Arjuna…Kill, murder, fully conscious, knowing fully that no one is murdered and no one is killed….Just become the instrument of Divine hands and know well that no one is killed, no one can be killed.”⁽⁹⁾

Rajneesh also states, that you are ignorant of your alleged deity: “This is the sin–not that you have murdered somebody or stolen; that is nothing. Those are minor sins.”⁽¹⁰⁾

In his commentary on the Bhagavad-Gita, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the founder of Transcendental Meditation, writes regarding Arjuna, that he should attain “a state of consciousness which will justify any action of his and will allow him even to kill in love in support of the purpose of evolution.”⁽¹¹⁾

From a related idea we read in the Kaushitaki Upanishad (3:1,2): “The man who know me as I am loses nothing whatever he does. Even if he kills his mother or father, even if he steals or procures an abortion, whatever evil he does, he does not blanch if he knows me as I am.”⁽¹²⁾

The second part of our first concept can also be easily seen in the writings of reincarnationists. Note the following examples.

John-Roger, the leader of the Movement for Spiritual Inner Awareness (MSIA) and self-appointed and would-be messiah is a contemporary example of this mentality:

Let’s look at the Vietnamese people for the last 3,000 years of their existence. As a collective group, they may have gotten exactly what they created for themselves, and they may have balanced all of their karma. Now, is it bad for them to be karmically free of all that? Is that wrong? Perhaps that particular freedom didn’t come about in a really popular way, in terms of what we all might have wanted it to be, but it came about in a way that was entirely perfect. There was no overkill; there was no underkill. The Americans that went over there and were caught up in it were part of the Vietnamese process thousands of years ago, and even though they were born in America [in] this life, they were pulled back there to complete their karma, also. And those who went through the war unharmed were not part of the process and came home safely. So how can that action be judged as “wrong”?⁽¹³⁾

Likewise Sybil Leek demonstrates the same idea. In her book, Reincarnation: The Second Chance, Leek tells us:

As difficult as it may be to understand tragedy, mental deficiency or imbalance seems all but impossible to comprehend. Why should a person, any person, lose his mind or part or it? Why should any child be born retarded and remain retarded throughout his life? Mental imbalance varies from imbecility to raving lunacy; heredity, environment, events all play their part–but why? The reincarnationist may well theorize as to the karmic significance of insanity, whether it be of the mild or the exaggerated sort.

It is possible that, in a former life, the insane of today occupied positions of authority from which they delighted in dictating to the minds of others. Even if they were not in positions of authority, they may have used a powerful personality in such a manner as to make weaker natures vulnerable to them. Whatever the circumstances, those people who cruelly dominate others bring about a particularly unfortunate type of victim–a person who, literally, cannot call his soul his own.

This is a situation that karma can readily solve. Those who rob others of the right to use their own minds may in time become the mindless ones themselves–to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the nature of their offense. What purpose could educational karma have in robbing a person of his mentality, other than to blast the spirit into a realization of the inquity [sic] of arrogantly dominating the mentality of others [emphasis in original]?⁽¹⁴⁾

Thus, Leek postulates that the mentally handicapped might well be simply suffering from their own karma.

I trust that the above references adequately demonstrate the first key concept of the supposed nature of humanity and the law of karma and its results.

Choice

The second critical concept that I want to survey, which stems from the first, is the view that whatever happens to one in life is simply the result of the individual’s choice (made conscious or unconscious, and made before or during this lifetime). One reason for this is that the reincarnationist might well want to work-off as much negative karma, and as quickly at that, as they possibly can in one lifetime–a veritable crash course of negative karma reduction. There are many instances of this type of thinking in reincarnationist’s literature.

For instance, when Shirley MacLaine’s daughter’s acting teacher was burned beyond recognition in a head-on collision, Shirley MacLaine questioned: “Why did she choose to die that way?”⁽¹⁵⁾

The neopagan Ceisiwr Serith writes: “There are two theories of how the circumstances of rebirth are determined. One is that the soul itself decides, based on what it feels it most needs to continue its advancement towards godhood.”⁽¹⁶⁾

In addressing the old assertions that we did not ask to be born or choose our parents, Susan Roberts records in her book, Witches, U.S.A.:

But, you see, you did, according to witchcraft beliefs. And you even chose the circumstances of your birth in order to gain a particular life experience which will speed your progression to an ever-ascending higher plane as one life succeeds another. Therefore, your life is your responsibility alone. If your mother was a fool and your father a brute, that’s their misfortune, not yours.

Nor does it matter how brutal or hopeless such circumstances may seem. If they are physically or emotionally insurmountable, then you are merely discharging a debt which you incurred through misusing some of the assets you enjoyed in a previous life.⁽¹⁷⁾

As bizarre as some of the previous ideas are in explaining why many people experience difficulties and tragedies, some reincarnationists hold views even more outlandish.

For example, Marion Weinstein takes the idea of choosing the circumstances of one’s life (e.g., tragedies) one step further, that is, to the time and manner of one’s death. Weinstein writes, “Within the karmic frame of reference, there are no accidents or coincidences. Nobody does anything to us unless we let them (or invite them). People do not wander into our lives at random. We draw them to us, invite them into our lives.”⁽¹⁸⁾ She also states, “Some events may appear to be accidents, but on closer investigation we can see that we provided the atmosphere for their occurrence. We either created each event, or drew it to us, or participated in it. Coincidences are never arbitrary happenings.”⁽¹⁹⁾ Thus, are we to infer that no matter what happens to us (e.g., devastating diseases, injuries, rape, torture), it is our karma, or we choose, consciously or unconsciously, to have it happen? Weinstein does not leave us guessing. She asserts:

…many other deaths do not seem to be choices: accidents, illnesses, murder, the deaths of young people. So many deaths seem arbitrary and beyond human control. But in the occult view these deaths were not arbitrary [sic] nor beyond the control of the people involved. The death-choices were subconscious choices, but choices just the same for any of a myriad of reasons.⁽²⁰⁾

These are wild claims! But she’s not done yet! Just when one thinks they have heard it all, Weinstein claims:

On the individual level, it may also seem impossible to understand the workings of karma in severe personal tragedy. How does karmic law explain such painful experiences as the loss of a loved one, serious illness, poverty, or any other occurrence which seems to be far from one’s personal choice?

I can only say, although it may sound simplistic in the abstract, that many painful experiences are based on someone else’s personal karmic choice; if such an experience seems painful for you, you may be viewing the other person’s karmic choice with a limiting perception.⁽²¹⁾

Really? So if I cringe at the thought of people being born with birth defects, being badly burned or burned to death, going blind, becoming crippled or deaf, being maimed or otherwise mutilated, dying, and so forth, this is just due to my limited perception?

What It All Means

Synthesizing the teachings of all the previous quotes in this section, we conclude that one is responsible for all circumstances that they find themselves in–including the disastrous ones.⁽²²⁾ All (minimally many) situations one finds themselves in are the result of reincarnation or transmigration and karma (the consequences of previous actions and choices) and/or one’s own conscious or unconscious choices. In the latter case, we allegedly choose each life and everything–all circumstances in that life–including tragedies. Thus, so we are told, we are responsible for our own choices (e.g., being bludgeoned or burned to death, mugged, murdered, suffering crippling injuries from a car wreck, raped, tortured, and so forth.⁽²³⁾

The Necessity to Experience Everything

The third critical concept that I want to briefly discuss is the idea that it is necessary for the reincarnationist to experience everything. That is, many reincarnationists believe that they need to experience, every (or close to it) type of experience possible. There are many reasons held among reincarnationists for this belief. For example, (1) either one has some negative karma in the concern under question and must pay it off, and/or (2) the individual wants to actualize or realize their alleged divine potential and/or potential deity, and/or (3) the person believes that they are divine, but must or at least it would be good for them, to have as many different types of experiences as possible to learn from and draw upon them so as to grow in their knowledge and maturity and/or as deity. (I can still remember the first time that someone–a fellow undergraduate philosophy major–told me that they believed this and wondered why I didn’t want to have every type of conceivable experience.) For these reasons and others, many reincarnationists want to have as many experiences as possible.

For example, the witch Raymond Buckland asserts, “…for its own evolution, it is necessary that the soul experience all things in life. It seems the most sensible, most logical, explanation of much that is found in life…Why should one be born crippled, another fit and strong?…if not because we must all eventually experience all things” (ellipsis in original).⁽²⁴⁾

Sybil Leek offers similar reasons for the existence and necessity of evil in the world.⁽²⁵⁾ For instance, in relating a dialogue regarding reincarnation and the notion that witches long for “numerous experiences,” Leek writes:

…my moderator friend asked me if I felt I had to experience being a murderer. I certainly do not in this life, because I know I have evolved beyond the idea of taking life; the total concept of witchcraft as a nature religion revolves around the aspect of love and the Life Force. How, then, can we want to experience this at this state of our spiritual evolution? Probably in one of my past lives, I too was a murderer; if this is so, then I also accept that in another incarnation I could have been a victim. If we accept logic, we must accept it on all issues.⁽²⁶⁾

Leek is saying in the context of the above passage that she did not at this point in her “spiritual evolution” need to experience being a murderer or other “negative experiences.”⁽²⁷⁾ However, if we follow logic, as Leek recommends we do, if she is to experience all things in her spiritual evolution, at one time she was a murderer. Also, according to her understanding, she already has been murdered in a previous life, or will be in a future life. For Leek this is true for all people.

Quoting from Raymond Buckland again, we see him stating a similar position:

Why should one be born crippled, another fit and strong? … [ellipsis in original] if not because we must all eventually experience all things…In the Witchcraft belief, then, one lifetime’s experiences are not dependent on the previous one’s. For example, if you suffer physical abuse in this life, it does not necessarily mean that you were an abuser in your previous life. It is possible you were, yes. But it is just as possible that you were not but are going to be in the next life. In other words, it is a case of experiencing all things–being both the abuser and the abusee, but one is not necessarily dependent on the other. Several lifetimes could even take place between the one experience and its apparent correlative [emphasis in original].⁽²⁸⁾

Notice that one must “eventually experience all things.” While Buckland, unlike Leek and some other reincarnationists, may not hold that everyone must experience everything (although this is debatable), he does hold that if something happens to a person, they already have, or will do the very same thing or at least something negatively comparable to it. Thus, the latter occurrence is appropriate recompense for the individuals action(s).

Reincarnation, Transmigration, Evil, and the Naturalistic Fallacy⁽²⁹⁾

At this point we need to reflect on and analyze the above concepts relative to reincarnation and transmigration. We basically been told that whatever happens to one in life is the best or morally correct course of events for them. No matter what happens to one it is just, and best for them because:

1. it stems from the nature of reality and one’s karma from action(s) from a previous life or lives, or the present or a future one(s); and/or

2. it is due to one’s own choice (consciously or unconsciously in this life or before it began); and/or

3. it is necessary (or at least desirable) in order for one to experience everything (including the negative or bad: what we call evil).

Given these views, how can reincarnationists conclude that anything tragic that happens to themselves or others is really evil or unjust? There are numerous examples that convey this mentality of reincarnationists.

For example, in Reincarnation: The Second Chance, Leek states: “Whatever the effects of karma, the reincarnationist knows that it works always for his own good. This may be hard to appreciate when we are suffering or see others suffer, but karma is never likely to crush us.”⁽³⁰⁾ In another comment Leek says, “An Eastern mystic once told me that whatever happened to him at any given time was the best possible thing that could happen to him, because it was for his ultimate good [emphasis in original]. I was too young at the time to accept this with understanding, but I never forgot it.”⁽³¹⁾

Another clear example of this occurs when, referring to the dark and light aspects of life and the supposed need to balance both in one’s life, Weinstein writes:

We may judge not only ourselves as “bad” (if we perceive error or negative behavior) but also judge Dark or negative aspects anywhere in life, as “bad” (i.e., death is bad, illness is bad, weakness is bad, old age is bad, anger, anxiety, worry, fear, insecurity, mistakes — all these and many other common occurrences may seem “bad”). But this is like saying the moon is bad when it wanes to crescent form, or that the sun is bad on a cloudy day. There is no judgment on the Dark. It exists in potential, in every life form, and without the Dark there could be no Light [emphasis in original].⁽³²⁾

In light of the quotations cited, here and in previous sections, it appears that no matter what happens to one, it ought to occur.

The Naturalistic Fallacy

The above explanations and views create more problems than they solve! Among these problems is the naturalistic fallacy (discussed below). Let’s examine some of the most problematic ramifications of the preceding views.

First, for example, if a women gets raped (or any other tragedy occurs to someone) in this life, does that means she raped someone in a previous (or will in a future) life, or committed (or will commit) some other equally despicable act to bring about her own rape? Therefore, she is only getting what she has sown (deserves?), thus, reaping her own karma? Hence, why should we feel sorry for her or attempt to intervene? (Furthermore, how can we punish the rapist if he is only fulfilling the law of karma, and actually helping the women?) These are detestable views, which I am not condoning, only extrapolating a point, but ones which nonetheless follow from the aforesaid ideas. Moreover, if these ideas were true, one could rightly ask if anything is unjust, wrong, or evil? But, this flies in the face of our intuition, our innate sense of sympathy, right and wrong, good and evil, and fairness.

Second, for instance, if one must experience all in life, this would include being abused, tortured, and so forth.⁽³³⁾ As ghastly as these thoughts are, this is what follows from the aforementioned concepts and ideas.

Third, in light of Leeks comments that “Whatever the effects of karma, the reincarnationist knows that it works always for his own good,” and her wholesale approval of the Eastern mystic’s remarks that “…whatever happened to him at any given time was the best possible thing that could happen to him, because it was for his ultimate good,” why would or how could one fight against their life circumstances? One should simply resign themselves to their life’s circumstances, no matter how brutal, deplorable or oppressive.

With the factors of the nature of reality, humanity, reincarnation, transmigration, and karma, and consciously or unconsciously choosing all the circumstances of one’s life, and the desire and/or need to experience all, it would appear that one ought to resolve to just accept whatever happens to them in life as the just or right, in fact, the best set of circumstances that could possibly occur to or for them. No matter what transpires–disease, hunger, lose of limbs or life, murder, poverty, rape, slavery, torture, and so forth, just accept it. It’s your life. After all, allegedly, “it’s for your own good,” your spiritual progress.

However, these ideas chaff against our intuition, our innate sense of fairness. Why should we accept these views? For instance, do we really choose our parents and all the circumstances of our lives? For women who are raped, is it their choice or karma, therefore, their responsibility or fault? Do reincarnationists or transmigrationists really believe this, or expect us to? How do they rationalize these views except by saying “whatever is, ought to be”?

It logically and ontologically follows from the previously discussed views that whatever is, ought (morally) to be. This is known in ethics as the naturalistic or is/ought fallacy, as it confuses “the way things are,” with how they morally should or ought to be.⁽³⁴⁾ In other words, one assumes that whatever is the case (descriptively speaking), morally (prescriptively or proscriptively speaking) ought to be the case or exist. (Instances of this fallacy in reincarnation literature are quite common.⁽³⁵⁾) Hence, what about the child born with crippling birth defects who dies an agonizing death within two years? Or what about women who are brutally raped, or people who or tortured or murdered? Should we respond, “Oh well, whatever is, ought to be” and thus just accept it as the way things are and ought to be? (After all it was the person’s karma, or their choice, or it is necessary to experience all things sooner or later.) No, I submit that even reincarnationists and transmigrationists do not, could not live consistently by this philosophy.

For example, imagine that Shirley MacLaine’s house in broken into and that many of her valuable possessions are destroyed or stolen, and she and her household are badly beaten-up and abused. Suppose further that just after her assailants are done and getting ready to leave, Shirley MacLlaine musters what little strength she has and says “Thank you, thank you so much. I really mean it. Oh, and don’t worry about me calling the police and trying to see you punished, you have done me a great favor. Now, actually, I owe you a great favor; you have helped me work-off a great among of negative karma, and of course, after all I did choose to have this happen, and besides, I needed to experience this, sooner or later, so thank you. Have a nice day!” Why not? After all they only helped her work-off negative karma, and she choose to undergo the experience, and needs it for her own spiritual evolution. Thus, the experience is only for her own good! Don’t hold your breath. Intuitively, we know that such a crime (and it is just that–a crime) or occurrence is wrong, and the perpetrators ought to be held responsible for their actions!

Furthermore, people like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao Se Tung, those who caused/committed the massacres of civilians in the Vietnam war, and others could really be heros.

Whether reincarnationists or transmigrationists like it or not, their worldview(s) logically and ontologically morally justifies any condition or conduct. These views justify any action, any action is right. For example, the torturing, maiming, or whatever, of reincarnationists or transmigrationists is not only okay, but even right, even good: one is just ultimately helping the person. These ideas add new meaning to the saying that “This hurts me more than you!” because whatever happens morally ought to happen; indeed, it is the best for one. By definition, whatever occurs is good.

Loss of Moral Moorings

Given the views of reincarnationists and transmigrationists, how would or could one know–in any objective and non-arbitrary sense whether a decision or what one was doing was right or wrong, good or bad, and hence (or minimally speaking) accruing negative or positive karma by “helping” one’s self or others with theirs? How could one know when they were harming or helping themselves or others? This would be quite arbitrary to say the least.

Additionally, there are other related problems. First, for instance, under these schemes of thinking where does or did the idea of right and wrong come from in the first place? Second, how can or could one distinguish between merely descriptive accounts of an action and proscriptive ones? Would there really be any difference between the two? What real difference or even meaning would or could either of these concepts, such as good or evil, have? Third, even if one could somehow derive such concepts in light of such thinking, again, how could/would one decide consistently and not merely arbitrarily what was good and what was evil or how to or to not accrue so-called negative or positive karma?

I believe that the aforementioned views result in an inability to morally distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong. With such a naturalistic approach one can only describe the way things are (e.g., the drink is hot or cold). One cannot make a moral evaluation. In other words, one can make merely descriptive evaluations, describe the way things are, but not prescriptive or proscriptive ones. How can one call any action morally wrong, including harming reincarnations or transmigrationists? It cannot be done, that is, at least not consistently with the above views. (No one can live consistently with this philosophy.) But reincarnations and transmigrationists often do say some actions are wrong! Or are they simply saying that they do not prefer certain actions? Hardly! Intuitively, they/we know certain things are wrong, such as abusing children, stealing from people, torturing reincarnationists and transmigrationists, and so forth. Reincarnationists do not say these things are merely not preferred, unpleasant, or inconvenient; they often insist that they are wrong! If they are consistent, they cannot call anything evil in the sense that it is wrong or is a “moral” judgment; it is merely descriptive, not proscriptive. Thus, reincarnationists must find a basis consistent with their views for making ethical evaluations.

Reincarnationists cannot, or at least certainly do not, live consistently with their avowed views. They must find some other basis for making ethical evaluations, or simply say “I do not like or prefer this or feel that it is right (such as, depriving reincarnationists of their rights), but not that it is morally wrong. It is just a case of feelings or taste–”some like this, some don’t.” It is mere preference. These statements are based upon feelings, personal preference or opinion, such as “I like corn but not spinach.” Thus, reincarnationists have no bedrock basis for saying that any act is morally evil.

We still have every reason to ask how reincarnationists answer the above dilemmas and the problem of the existence of evil. These are perplexing problems for reincarnationists and transmigrationists given their views. Merely dismissing them will not solve it, nor make it magically disappear.

Further Philosophical Difficulties

Furthermore, there are other significant philosophical (e.g., metaphysical/ontological) critiques that need to be considered relative to reincarnation and transmigration (e.g., relative to the worldviews in which these views generally occur, i.e., polytheism, pantheism, and panentheism). For instance, the worldviews in which most reincarnationists’ and transmigrationist’s views are found do not allow for an ethically justifiable or adequate answer to the problems posed in this paper. That is, the views of reincarnationists and of transmigrationists are not consistent with, nor do they logically or ontologically follow from the worldviews most commonly held by reincarnationists: polytheism, pantheism and panentheism.⁽³⁶⁾

For example, in a pantheistic or panentheistic universe, reincarnationists (all of us for that matter) must realize that, ontologically, evil emanates or flows naturally and necessarily from the very nature of the deity or the One.⁽³⁷⁾ Creation flows from the will or very nature of the deity. Creation and the existence of evil are synonymous and simultaneous.⁽³⁸⁾ This entails that death, destruction, evil, suffering, and so forth are part of the divinity’s or ultimate Beings very essence or nature. Good and evil are both aspects or facets of the One. All is contained in, arises out of, or is a manifestation of the absolute universal Reality or divinity or principle–the One. Evil is ultimately and necessarily part of the One which is all. Therefore, in one sense or another, the divinity (or whatever term is used) is responsible for all the pain, suffering, and evil that has, does, or ever will exist.

In a pantheistic or panentheistic world good and evil are so to speak just different sides of the same coin. Moreover, since the divinity manifests itself in polarities or dualities, such as light-dark, positive-negative, or good-evil, evil is a necessary part of the universe. Thus, who or what brought evil into existence? Evil must ultimately derive from the divinity that many reincarnationists and transmigrationists say they worship.⁽³⁹⁾

Eternal Evil

Whether in a polytheistic, pantheistic, or panentheistic universe, we can have no assurance that the deity(ies) or divinity can or wants to defeat evil. Nor can we be sure that this is even an appropriate question, since in the latter two worlds evil is always part of the deity’s or One’s very nature. Likewise, many if not all reincarnationists who are simple polytheist (i.e., not pantheist or panentheist as well) also view the gods and goddesses as possessing evil in their nature. Therefore, evil will no more cease to exist than these entities or the deity itself. In other words, evil is eternal. It will always be with us–always exist!⁽⁴⁰⁾ Evil is eternal because (1) it is either an aspect of the very nature of the divinity which creates and composes all (pantheism, panentheism), or (2) these deities also contain evil in their nature, and/or (3) are too limited or inept to permanently accomplish the task (polytheism). Only an infinite (e.g., omniscient, omnipotent) and benevolent personal God could and will banish evil from the universe.⁽⁴¹⁾

Given the nature of reality in a pantheistic or panentheistic universe, theoretically speaking, even if evil were to be eradicated or silenced for a period of time, it would only inevitability return again with a shrill scream.

In summation, there are only so many options regarding the future of evil given the reincarnationists’ worldviews: 1) The gods and goddesses cannot and/or will not bring an end to evil (polytheism). 2) The gods and goddesses or divinity cannot and will not stop evil because evil is part of their or its very nature, therefore, also the part of the very fabric from which the universe it cut (pantheism, panentheism). Hence, since evil is part of the very nature of the deity it is also inherent to creation. Therefore, evil is eternal.

Thus, reincarnationists and transmigrationists have no justified hope or expectation that evil in its multitude of manifestations will ever be banished. They have no grounds to believe that the divinity can or ever will put an end to the misery and suffering that pervasively invades our world, nor that they could ever ultimately escaped from samsara.

Evil: No Exit

The problem of evil is an acute dilemma, indeed, an Achilles’ heel for reincarnationists and transmigrationists given their worldviews. There is no way for them to get around it.

Nor will it do for them to say that the divine is “beyond good and evil,” or neither “good nor evil.” Nonsense. These types of statements have no ultimate meaning or significance. More deplorable yet, this statement can result in diabolical consequences. For instance, imagine burning a reincarnationist’s house to the ground. If they said that what was done was wrong (evil even?), one could reply that like the deity these concepts did not apply to them because they were beyond right or wrong, good or evil. Rightly, we do not believe the that the reincarnationist would accept their reply. But, once again the glaring inconsistency between avowed view and practice. The only thing that is beyond anything here is that it is beyond my understanding how reincarnationists can actually make these nonsensical statements. The deity is not beyond evil, it is evil!

Conclusion

Ironically, in light of the claims of reincarnationists and transmigrationists, neither reincarnation nor transmigration are ethically viable answers to the problems of inequality, injustice, suffering and evil. Indeed, I believe that it has been sufficiently shown in this paper, as brief as it is relative to the breadth of the topic, that both of these views not only do not adequately answer the concerns addressed in this paper, but that both are the source of much inequality, injustice, suffering and evil themselves.

Endnotes

 

 

 

 

 

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19. Ibid., 99.

20. Ibid., 103.

21. Ibid., 110.

22. This paragraph was adapted from a draft copy of a paragraph that appears on page 171 of my book, Witchcraft.

23. See, e.g., Raymond Buckland, Buckland’s Complete Book of Witchcraft (St. Paul: Llewellyn Publications, 1988), 17-18; Leek, Complete, 146-147; Leek, Reincarnation, 45-50; Roberts, Witches, 147-149; Marion Weinstein, Positive Magic: Occult Self-Help (Custer, Wash.: Phoenix Publishing, 1981), 98-114.

24. Buckland, Complete Book of Witchcraft, 17.

25. See, e.g., Leek, Complete, 146-147; Leek, Reincarnation, 46-50.

26. Complete, 147.

27. This paragraph is adapted from page 169 of my book Witchcraft.

28. Buckland, Complete Book of Witchcraft, 17, 18.

29. The following two sections are adapted from my book Witchcraft, 171-74.

30. Leek, Reincarnation, 45.

31. Ibid., 50.

32. Weinstein, Positive Magic, 250.

33. See e.g., Buckland, Complete Book of Witchcraft, 17-18; Laurie Cabot and Tom Cowan, Power of the Witch (New York: Dell, 1989), 202, 221, 280-82; Leek, Complete, 32, 47, 146-47; Leek, Reincarnation, 41, 45-50; Roberts, Witches, 147-50; Starhawk (Miriam Simos), Dreaming the Dark: Magic, Sex and Politics, new ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 27-30, 99; and Weinstein, Positive Magic, 98-114 and 249-250, for the horrific results of this type of belief. For further critiques of reincarnation, consult Albrecht, Reincarnation, 51-111, 127-130; Geisler and Amano, The Reincarnation Sensation, 57-86, 99-102, 107-109, 112.

34. See, e.g., Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), s.v., “naturalistic fallacy (ethics)”; Alex C. Michalos, Improving Your Reasoning (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), s.v., “Is-ought.”

35. See, e.g., note 31.

36. Space does not permit a thorough discussion of these points. However, they are discussed at length by Geisler and Watkins in Worlds Apart, 75-146, 239-53, 250-52, 255-69; and Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 173-213.

37. For sound and more through critiques of pantheism see Beckwith and Parrish, See the Gods Fall, 208-16; Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 185-192; Norman Geisler and David K. Clark, Apologetics in the New Age: A Christian Critique of Pantheism (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990), 155-158, 159-202, 203-221; Worlds Apart, 101-105. For solid and lengthier critiques of panentheism see Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 208-213; Worlds Apart, 140-145.

38. Albrecht, 106-109.

39. See Jeffrey B. Russell, A History of Witchcraft: Sorcerers, Heretics and Pagans (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1982), 33, 160.

40. See Albrecht 106-109.

41. For a full discussion of this issue, see Norman Geisler, The Roots of Evil (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979); Norman L. Geisler and Winfried Corduan, Philosophy of Religion (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), Part Four (“God and Evil”), 293-385. The reader can also consult these works for handling the problem of evil in the context of an orthodox Christian perspective. We would argue that only the personal infinite triune God who has revealed Himself in the Bible wants to, can, and will banish evil from the universe!

by Craig S. Hawkins

The Critical Issue

Since F.C. Baur proposed his thesis in the mid-nineteenth century and the corresponding rise of the infamous Tubingen school of radical higher critical thought of the New Testament, the book of Acts has fallen upon hard times concerning its value as a historical work. That is, Acts was no longer viewed by many as a theological-historical work composed in the latter part of the first century A.D., by Luke who was a friend, disciple, travelling companion of the apostle Paul, and an eye witness of much of what he wrote (from 16:11 onward).

According to Baur and his disciples, reasoning under the influence of Hegelian, evolutionary, and anti-supernaturalistic a priori presuppositions, Acts was seen as a product of a highly skillful and imaginatively creative writer of the latter part of the second century A.D. The author was an artful and captivating story teller who weaved together tales of intrigue and suspense into a theological tapestry.  In other words, the author was not writing history but “theology.”

This writer, whomever he might have been, was attempting to synthesis the Pauline (thesis) school of Christianity with the Petrine devotees (antithesis). Acts was the result of such an effort (synthesis). Thus, the work now known as Acts was not intended to be a historical account proper of the early church. Indeed, it is quite unhistorical in many accounts and details. Hence, we should not expect it to be a “history book” of earliest Christianity, as that was not the author’s intention. Arising out of the speculations of the Tubingen school have come a multitude of radical higher critical views. Utilizing literary/source, form, and/or redaction criticism, these theories have proposed that a redactor or redactors composed the book of Acts out of numerous, more or less independent oral and/or written traditions or sources. From these traditions they patched together a theological quilt–the book of Acts.

With either of the above schemes, and with all the views between these two extremes, is the common thread of Acts not being historically reliable.⁽¹⁾  All these radical higher critical views have in common the notion that the book of Acts is a late second century work at best, and is unreliable, and therefore, untrustworthy as a historical source for the earliest years of the church, or for that matter most of the topics it touches upon.

Therefore, obviously Acts can not be relied on for accurate data of the formation and history of the early church, let alone does this second century literary piece correctly convey geographical, topographical, societal, political, religious, etc., data. It was not meant to. Its primary purpose was to fulfill a didactic function; that is, to express the
religious experiences, feelings, world view, and struggles of Christians (primarily from the 2nd century), and not to portray the first century church’s development and interaction with the world. As such it is “theological” literature, and not an attempt at history proper. Thus, we should not be surprised at the many and often glaring historical inaccuracies of this book, since is was written at such a late date, and too far removed from the actual events, culture, and concerns of first century Christianity. It follows that Acts not only is not, but cannot, be read has reliable history, as for example, as one would read Herodotus, let alone Thucydides or Polybius.

Our Critical View and Method

To scrutinize these theories pertaining to the historicity of Acts and see if they fit the facts, we want to examine them in the light of archaeology. Ergo, we shall examine some of the archaeological data as it pertains to the book of Acts. Our primary sources will include literature from private and public correspondence, records, civil law codes and proclamations. Also, we shall consider epigraphical data, obtained from the study of diverse types of inscriptions, found on various kinds of objects, such as buildings, monuments, steles, etc., from the time around the period in question that relates directly or indirectly to our topic.

It logically follows that by comparing and contrasting the internal details (from within the book of Acts itself) with the information derived from external and independent sources (e.g., the archaeological sources listed above), we should be able to reasonably conclude if he book of Acts is historically reliable or not. To the point, if the radical higher critical views of Acts being basically unreliable and their framework for dating Acts in the latter part of the second century is correct, then the preponderance of evidence should bear this out with collaborating testimony from archaeology. On the other hand, if Acts is historically reliable, and thus probably having been written within the perimeters of the orthodox view, sometime in the latter part of the first century, the archaeological evidence should support this thesis. Either way our understanding can and should be expanded by the insights archaeology has to offer.

Furthermore, the appeal to the bar of archaeology not only should, but must be made given the radical higher critics preconceived ideas which disallow what the Scriptures state about themselves, that is, that the book of Acts was compiled from trustworthy sources where Luke was not present at a given event, or that he was a literal eyewitness
to the rest of what he reports. The radical critics flatly deny these claims! Therefore, we shall appeal to the court of archaeology.

The orthodox viewpoint has nothing to fear and everything to gain from such an investigation. If Acts was written at an early date by Luke the physician, is reliable history, and not just in “religious” matters, then the witness of archaeology will affirm this verdict.

It is my contention that when the archaeological evidence is consulted, it clearly decides in the favor of the orthodox view of Acts, and that it is extremely reliable, not only on things theological, but “secular” history as well! In other words, although the book of Acts is not primarily concerned with history qua history, or in and of itself, it is nonetheless accurate when it comments upon historical events or issues that lay within its purview.

Accordingly, I will argue, and hope to show that because radical higher critical views of Acts cannot withstand the cross-examination of archaeology, these views are deserving of radical skepticism themselves. Yea, to be rejected and banished from the halls of higher learning in particular and the kingdom of academia and truth universally. The cold hard facts refute the speculations of the radical higher critics In short, it’s the classic case of a gang of brute facts beating up a nice theory.

Thus, my view is that the book of Acts is an extremely reliable historical source, contra the opinions of radical higher critics. In fact, this writer holds the book of Acts to not only be reliable, but the infallible and inerrant Word of God. However, due to constraints of space and scope I cannot address this issue in our present discussion.

To accomplish our task we shall examine the findings from archaeology in five major areas of study. We will compare and contrast what is stated in the book of Acts with what we presently know to actually be the case in the areas of knowledge under discussion. This will be conducted in a thematic manner, and chronologically within each individual
category according to the chapters in the book of Acts. These topics are (1) cultural milieus, (2) nautical concerns, (3) judicial knowledge, (4) geopolitical statements, and lastly (5) titles of governmental officials.

It needs to be noted that I make no pretensions at presenting an exhaustive study of the issue at hand. Unfortunately, we can only offer a brief treatment of each topic and must pass by a copious amount of pertinent information. Due to the dearth of available data we will only be surveying select examples from the pool of possible passages to
establish our thesis. These shall have to suffice to illustrate and vindicate our point. (However, in addition to the bibliography, a large number of direct references have been cited throughout out the paper for further study.) Moreover, we will only be looking at archaeology and the book of Acts alone, not the gospel of Luke or any other sections of the New Testament.

Furthermore, we cannot deal with many of the problematic or disputed passages of Acts that are in question in light of archaeological findings. As yet most of these findings are ambiguous regarding the conclusions that should be drawn from them. In essence, the jury is still out, and rather than work from what we do not know, we will work with what we do know and can with reasonable confidence draw valid conclusions there from. On issues that we have inconclusive or no archaeological data, we will more than likely only reach inconclusive conclusions at best, and idle speculation at worst.

Our citing of the evidence that appears to support our thesis, and not treating that which does not, is not to selectively cite in order to “stack the deck” in our favor and only deal with what suits our views. This is not the case. Our approach is in accord with the “principle of charity,” that teaches that in disputable matters, the benefit of the doubt is to be granted to the document in question, unless compelling and studied evidence warrants conclusions otherwise (Montgomery p. 29). In short, we are not to assume that the text is in error unless the evidence clearly merits such a view. And if a document proves truthful in every area that we are able to check its claims, then
it is reasonable to grant that it is correct in areas or subjects which we are not able to directly verify.

This is especially true in our case when the text of Acts has been variously assumed to have erred, but has proven time and time again that it was not in err, but in fact, possessed correct and extremely precise data. Thus, if a writer such as Luke proves himself correct over and over again (as we shall see below), and conversely his critics
prove wrong over and over again, we are justified in suspending judgment (assuming the writer is in error), and giving the benefit of the doubt to the normally trustworthy writer on moot points (see Bruce, AAGT, p. 17; Ramsay, BRD, p. 80).

Ironically, as we shall presently see, there has been so much information gathered from archaeology to confirm the accuracy and historicity of Acts, that the radical higher critic are the ones who ought to be doubted, not the text! The evidence decidedly does not warrant the historical berating Acts has received. In fact, it demands just the opposite!
That is, the document is at least a reliable work of theological and historical literature.

The Cultural Milieus in the Book of Acts

If the book of Acts is historically reliable when it discuss various cultural settings and locations, archaeological findings that pertain to a given setting should verify the comments. Furthermore, if the book was written in the first (or second) century, then it should relate the facts and local color appropriate to that time period. We can reasonably
discern both of these questions by noting the events, society norms, customs, beliefs, practices, vocations, institutions, buildings, nomenclature, topography, etc., which are mentioned in Acts. Hence, we now turn our attention to the sitz em leben of some of the communities reported in Acts.

First, we cite Acts 14:11-13, where Luke not only records simple events, but enlivens his narrative with the feel of Lystra, a small “back woods” and relatively insignificant town (see Ramsay, BRD, pp. 45-50, CSP, pp. 407-418, SPT, pp. 114-119). Luke notes that the native populace of Lystra spoke their own language, Lycaonian, in this encounter, and not Greek as we might expect from a Greek city that became a Roman colony. This fact suggests that the worshippers in question were not Roman coloni, but the less educated natives. Pottery found from the first century period in the vicinity of Lystra contains a few fragments of Roman pottery, with the majority of the fragments being
Hellenistic (Greek) (Thompson, LH, p. 11). It seems that the local populace was stratified into two basic levels: the educated Greek portion with corresponding Greek manners and language, and the uneducated natives who retained their own language. Additionally, we are told that these people worshipped gods they called Zeus and Hermes. An inscriptions located near Lystra from around 250 A.D. records a dedication to Zeus and Hermes, by men
with Lycaonian names (ibid. p. 12). Thus, there is good reason to believe that Luke passed on to us not only correct facts regarding the native populace of an unimportant city at this time, but that he did it in a manner that also gives us a glimpse into the ambiance of the Lycaonian culture.

Second, the author of Acts tells us in 16:12-39 many specific details about this Roman colony, Philippi. For example, he informs us about the market place where the magistrates convened court, that there is a city gate by a river etc., (see Thompson, BA, p. 395). All these facts have been verified by archaeological, historical, and topographical studies (Thompson, LH, p. 14-15).

Third, Athens is mentioned in Acts 17:16-34. Our writer brings to our attention numerous details about the city in his narrative (see Ramsay, SPT, pp. 237-253). Paul was provoked by an inscription he read that was dedicated “to the unknown god.” He debated moral questions with some Athenian philosophers in the market place before the
Areopagus council. It has been established that metaphysical and ethical discussions were routinely carried on at the Athenian market place. The ancient court and most venerable of Athenian institutions, the Areopagus, held control over lectures. This important council named after the hill, Areopagus, meet in the days of Paul in the Royal Colonnade in the market place just as Luke states (see Ramsay, BRD, pp. 102-105; SPT, pp. 243-245; and
Thompson, LH, pp. 16-18,).

Another particularly interesting tidbit is the disdainful Athenian retort in 17:18 by the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers of Paul being a “babbler” (spermologos). This is an authentic touch of characteristic Athenian social slang (Ramsay, SPT, pp. 241-243).

Athens was indeed a “very religious” city. We know that Athens had a large number of temples, and religious statues and images. Josephus and other early writers were similarly impressed, as Paul was, regarding the Athenian preoccupation with the gods (Bruce, CBA, p. 355). Still yet, we know that there were numerous inscriptions on alters
in Athens dedicated to “to an unknown god.” Pausanias, of the second century A.D., and Diogenes Laertes, from the third century, both mentioned such alters to these anonymous deities (ibid., p. 355; Yamauchi, p.116). Thompson informs us that “Philostratus in the early third century spoke of Athens `where even unknown divinities have alters erected to them’” (Thompson, BA, p. 399). The writer of Acts again accurately records cultural facts of a society.

Finally, on our list of cities, we will consider some of Luke’s comments on the city and of Ephesus. In Acts 19:18-41 a host of significantly verifiable items are brought to our attention. (1) The city allegedly possessed a considerable number of inhabitant who practiced sorcery (2) A rather large trade existed in the city that derived its income
from the manufacture and distribution of silver idols of the alleged goddess Artemis (Diana). (3) The alleged goddess had a temple in Ephesus. (4) There was some type of theater in the city.

The archaeological facts are such that all of the above observations by Luke have been confirmed (Thompson, LH, p. 19-23). Ephesus in ancient times was known for its sorcery and occultic practices, so much so that the phrase Ephesia grammata or “Ephesian scripts or writings” became a common term in the Greco-Roman world for magical texts (Bruce, CBA, p. 391-392; Unger, ANT, p.260). Some fairly early magical papyrus texts of this type are still extant today (see Deissmann, pp. 254, 302-305, 453, etc.). Many of these idols mentioned above have been found, as well as the remains of the temple (its dimensions were 160 feet by 340 feet). The remains of the theater have also been located. It was approximately 495 feet in diameter, and is estimated to have been able to seat 24,500 persons. Within the theater was discovered an inscription describing numerous gold and silver images of Artemis, weighing from three to seven pounds each (Thompson, LH, p. 21).

These findings (especially when conjoined with further findings numerated below), reveal Luke’s apparent eyewitness descriptions (either his own or that of Paul’s) of the events and places cited above by his vivid portrayals of life and the social matrix of the communities Paul visited.

Acts not only is teaming with minute details of the “stuff of civilizations,” but contains comments on external environmental factors which effected these communities as well. For instance, Luke takes note of a severe famine, during the rule of emperor Claudius, that plagued large parts of the Roman empire (Acts 11:27-30). The accuracy of
this account was challenged by various scholars, who fancied this as an “imaginative” invention of Luke, because they were not aware of independent confirmation of it.

However, historical evidence, independent of Acts, has supplemented our previously famished diet of knowledge on this topic (see Ramsay, SPT, pp. 48-52, 68-69; and Bruce, CBA, p. 243, for further information on the time and extent of the famine[s]). Suetonius, the Roman historian who lived at the end of the first century and into the second,
referred to austere conditions at the time of Claudius caused by “…a scarcity of provisions, occasioned by bad crops for several years” (as cited in Thompson, LH, p. 7). Dion Cassius, a statesman and writer, along with Tacitus, a Roman historian (55-120 A.D.), both refer to two famines in Rome in the first century (ibid. p. 7). Eusebius, the
great Christian historian, and the Jewish historian, Josephus (37-95 A.D.), also mentions a severe famine in Asia Minor and Judea respectively in the first century (ibid. p. 7). Thus, we have independent and secular writers who attest to the fact of Luke’s statement.

Acts not only demonstrates a throughout and extremely reliable account of the communities Paul interacted with, and environmental factors, but additionally, the role and importance of Roman citizenship in the first century.

During the first century A.D. Roman citizens were an especially privileged class of individuals throughout the Roman empire. They had special rights and privileges, such as unique legal rights and exemption from the taxes of local communities, etc., which non-Romans did not share (see Sherwin-White, RSRL, pp. 144-171).

In Acts 16:37-38 and other passages, Paul makes much of his Roman citizenship relative to certain rights this gave him. This and many other comments found in Acts harmonizes beautifully with what we know regarding these issues in the first century A.D. For example, we have a parallel case to Paul’s in Acts 16, from Cicero’s writings where he
talks about one C. Servilius, who was beaten and abused by governmental officials. Cicero rhetorically asks “is there any legal reason why this should happen to any Roman citizen?” (as cited in Sherwin-White, RSRL, p. 172). The style and circumstances differ in the above two cases, but the tone, the alarm, the concern about how a Roman
citizens should, or should not in these cases, be treated is the same.

However, there were major Roman societal and judicial changes pertaining to the rights of Roman citizenship that began early in the second century A.D. (ibid., pp. 68-70, 172-175, and 179-185). But, Acts evidences none of these substantial societal changes. It accurately mirrors the value and role of local governments and Roman citizenship from the first century, not those of the second or latter centuries (ibid., pp. 179-185). As Sherwin-White says, “Acts breathes the climate of the earlier phase” (ibid., p.173).

Therefore, the value and place of Roman citizenship in Acts properly represents the culture during the first century A.D., and conversely not according to its social evolution in the second.

Thus, to conclude this part of our discussion, we observe that the writer of Acts, based upon our discussion so far, not only is historically reliable, but he has far more to offer us. He accurately captures and vividly portrays intimate and precise information as he paints a picture for us, that is, a lifelike and authentic first century mood and feel of the local-color and societal and religious practices, customs, and institutions of the locales it mentions. He demonstrates apparent eye witness experiences (his own or Paul’s) that explain his keen and penetrating knowledge and insights of the places and events he writes about. In short, it has the ring of truth in describing the places Paul visited and historical events that occurred (see Ramsay, BRD, pp. 79-89; SPT. pp. 8-9). To sum up this section of our discussion we quote Sherwin-White and Ramsay respectively:

In Acts or in that part of Acts which is concerned with the adventures of Paul in Asia
Minor and Greece, one is aware all the time of the Hellenistic and Roman setting. The
historical framework is exact. In terms of time and place the details are precise and
correct. One walks the streets and market-places, the theatres and assemblies of
first-century Ephesus or Thessalonica, Corinth or Philippi, with the author of Acts.
…The feel and tone of city life is the same as in the descriptions of Strabo and Dio of
Prusa…In all these ways Acts takes us on a conducted tour of the Greco-Roman world. The
detail is so interwoven with the narrative of the mission as to be inseparable. (RSRL,
pp.120, 121)

In Ephesus Paul taught `in the school of Tyrannus’; in the city of Socrates he
discussed moral questions in the market-place. How incongruous it would seem if the
methods were transposed! But the narrative never makes a false step amid all the many
details, as the scene changes from city to city; and that is the conclusive proof that it
is a picture of real life. (SPT, p. 238)

Nautical Knowledge and Acts

The writer of Acts knowledge of the Greco-Roman cultural milieus in the first century is matched by understanding of nautical matters. Rackham says regarding Acts 27 that “the story is told with such a wealth of detail that in all classical literature there is no passage which gives us so much information about the working of an ancient
ship” (as cited in Robertson, LH, p. 206). Luke has an appreciation for the sea and this comes through in the relevant passages (primarily in Acts 27:1-41). Again, we can undertake only a cursory survey of our topic. (For further study on this subject see Ramsay, SPT, pp. 331-339; Robertson, LH, pp. 206-216; and Smith’s entire work, VSSP.)

Luke’s recital of the type of ships used and some of their features, their courses charted, the winds they sailed under or were hindered by, storms encountered, the Islands named, sailing techniques, and much more squares with our knowledge of ancient and modern navigation, having been verified by external and independent evidence (Robertson, p.216). A few examples will have to suffice for our purposes.

Luke uses very precise terminology in discussing some of the details of their journeys. Smith and Ramsay list some specifics (see Robertson, p. 214; Ramsay, SPT, p. 328). For instance, “…They sailed under [hyperleusamen] the lee of Cyprus, keeping northwards with a westerly wind on the beam” (Acts 27:4); “here they ran before a wind under [hypodramontes] the lee of Clauda” (Acts 27:14). Likewise, in 27:14 we are told of a wind of typhonic force, the “northeaster” (euraquilo), which swept down from an island (Crete). At its height the Cretan mountains in question
are over 7000 feet. It is the case even today that quite suddenly and unexpectedly near hurricane strength winds can flow down the mountains and create havoc for sailing vessels in the underlying waters (Ramsay, SPT, p. 327).

Robinson, sums up Luke’s contribution and the value and accuracy of his sea-voyages when he stated: “it is to Luke that we owe the most vivid as well as the most accurate account of sea-voyaging that has come down to us from antiquity. Experts in navel science agree that it is without a parallel” (as cited in Robertson, LH, p. 207).

Acts on Trial

Luke’s portrayal of the legal system within the Roman empire in the first century, as already briefly cited, is as informed as the other areas we have already discussed. Thus, whether Paul is being confronted by mobs and their demagogish rulers, the seething Sanhedrin, local Jewish tribunals, hauled before civil magistrates, the arrogant Areopagus council, proconsuls, prefects, later known as procurators (after A.D.44), such as Felix and Festus, or a vassal king like Agrippa, Luke’s narratives coincide with what we know of the first century judicial processes. Charges and proceedings are written in contemporary and accurate language. Let’s examine a few note worthy cases of Luke’s accurate court reporting.

Acts 25:16 records the statement that “…it is not the Roman custom to hand over any man before he has faced his accusers and has had opportunity to defend himself against their charges.” This remark by procurator Festus, written down by Luke, accords perfectly with Roman jurisprudence of the first century (see Sherwin-White, RSRL, p.48).

Or in 25:18 we read that the governor remarked “The accusers brought no charges against him which I could take cognizance.” The Greek word rendered by “take cognizance” or “understand” (NIV “expected,” KJV “supposed”) has a technical meaning (Sherwin-White, TC, p. 101). The Greek phrase in question, on ego hypenooun, in its strongest sense means “suspect” (Sherwin-White, RSRL, p.50). In a legal context, it does not mean that Festus literally could not understand the issues, but that the issue brought before him to adjudicate was a religious issue, which fell out side the normal domain of the law. Therefore, it fits naturally, given the unusual charges brought against Paul, for Festus, to request King Agrippa’s help as an assessor (legal advisor), a common practice of the day, in order to draft the formal charges against Paul to send along with him to Rome (see Sherwin-White, TC, pp. 100-101; and RSRL, p. 51). Furthermore, we are aware of other indictments against different parties parallel to the one in Acts leveled at Paul
(Sherwin-White, p. 51). In short, the whole proceeding, as are the rest mentioned in Acts, accurately represents the legal procedures of the day in the first century A.D. (Sherwin-White, TC, p. 101).

Based upon his through studies of the legal accounts recorded in Acts, the renowned Roman and legal historian Sherwin-White pronounces his verdict on the case before us in the following statement: “The accounts of these trials in Acts is so technically correct that Roman historians since Mommsen have often judged them as the best
illustration of Roman provincial jurisdiction in this particular period” (TC, p. 101). And in circumscribing our topic of the historicity of Acts from its presentation of judicial concerns he declared: “For Acts the confirmation of historicity is
overwhelming….any attempt to reject its basic historicity even in matters of detail must now appear absurd. Roman historians have long taken if for granted” (RSRL, p. 189). (For further study on this subject consult Ramsay, BRD, pp. 90-105; Robertson, LH, pp. 190-205; and Sherwin-White’s TC, and RSRL.)

Acts on the Geopolitical Map

The writer of Acts excels in his geopolitical knowledge of the day in realms that Paul transversed, and later he and Paul visited together (Acts 16:6 onward) on their various missionary journeys. As we shall currently see Luke is no less precise in these details than in any other concern his book treats. (To help keep the many cities, regions,
provinces, etc., straight in one’s mind, consult the map on the following page.)

First, on our tour is Acts 13:49, where we are told regarding the Antiochian territory that “the word of the Lord spread through the whole region.” We know from archaeological findings, an inscription, that Antioch, which was in the province of Galatia, was the center of a Roman region, Galatic Phrygia, during the time of Paul’s visits and travels (Ramsay, SPT, p. 103; Thompson, BA, p. 393; LH,p. 10). Hence, Antioch was the center of the region called Phrygia (or the Phrygian Region) within the province of Galatia (Ramsay SPT, p. 102). Thus, it is a simple, but quite telling and accurate comment to note that the word spread through the region, of which Antioch was the chief military and civil center (Ramsay, SPT, pp. 102-105).

Second on our stop is Acts 14:6 and the “…cites of Lycaonia, and unto the region that lieth round about.” The above was a special region, within the province of Galatia, composed of two cities and a tract of cityless territory, from 37 to 72 A.D. only (see Ramsay, SPT, pp. 110-113). Although Iconium and Lystra were quite close to each other
speaking merely geographically, and carried on commercial trade and social intercourse, they were nonetheless in different political regions, (but within the same province). Iconium belonged to the region of Phrygia Galatica, while Lystra belonged to the Lycaonia Galatica region (see Bruce, CBA, pp. 288-289; Ramsay, BRD, 39-63; Thompson,
BA, p. 393). Numerous radical and moderate scholars have assumed that Acts 14:6 was just another case of Luke being wrong about the facts. But objective archaeological evidence once again has vindicated Acts, and not the armchair critics. Luke thus gives us not only correct, but a precise piece of geopolitical information.

Third, Luke further instructs us on geopolitical items in Acts 16:6-8. In Roman times Phrygia, a large area in Asia Minor, was divided. Part of it went to the Roman province of Asia, being titled Phrygia Asiana, while the other part of Phrygia went into the Roman province of Galatia (referred to above), and was called Phrygia Galatica (Thompson, LH,
p.13). Sir William Ramsay found an inscription in 1911 that proved that Luke’s geographical terminology of the passage under consideration was not only correct, but quite acutely at that (see Bruce, CBA, pp. 324-326; and Thompson, LH, p. 13).

Fourth, Luke speaks of Philippi in Acts 16:12 being a Roman colony and the leading or first city of its region or part. These three points have been proven to be correct. Philippi was a Roman colony, founded by Roman veterans (Yamauchi, SS, p. 115) Also, the title of “first” or “leading” was used by some to describe Philippi (see Sherwin-White, RSRL, pp. 93-96). While it is true that scholars debate exactly what this title (“first”) meant, the fact remains that it was nevertheless used for Philippi (see Bruce, CBA, p. 330; Thompson, BA. p.395) Lastly, papyri from Egypt have been discovered that substantiate Luke’s usage of the Greek word meris to mean region (Yamauchi, SS, p. 115). Apparently colonists from Macedonia used this word as an idiom. Through these and other details, once again, Acts demonstrates its historicity and firsthand knowledge of a city and germane geopolitical factors by sharing
with us insightful comments, such as local idioms and the title that the Philippians liked to proudly appropriate for their community, that give us not only a reliable, but a larger than life profile of Philippi. (For further study on Philippi see Ramsay, SPT, pp. 201-226; and Unger, pp. 218-219.)

The bottom line of the above discussion of geopolitical accounts of Acts is that they were not only correct, but uncannily precise. In each of the above cases and more that could be cited, Acts was believed to be in error and hence disputed. However, archaeological evidence has again and again confirmed its accuracy. The radical critics,
on the other hand have been disproved time land time again. Acts has been acquitted by objective testimony and evidence of the serous charges of errors in the geopolitical sphere and conversely has shown itself to be an extremely trustworthy document on the geopolitical landscape of the first century communities it mentions. (For further study on
this topic in general, see Ramsay’s CSP and SPT.)

Judging a Book by its Titles

Acts affords us with yet another opportunity to measure its historical reliability by external and independent sources. By cross-checking the wide variety of titles employed for various religious and governmental officials in it with archaeological data from the corresponding time period, Acts historical worth can be discerned. (For a brief
explanation of the major types of rulers within the Roman empire from A.D. 14 onward, see Sherwin-White, TC, p. 98-102.) You may not be able to accurately judge a book by its cover, but in our case we can certainly judge Acts by it titles.

Acts 13:7 mentions one Sergius Paulus, the proconsul (or the Greek anthupatos, that translates the Latin proconsul) of the island of Cyprus, who was ruling from the seat of the provincial government in Paphos at the time of Paul’s visit. This passage has been greatly contested since is was believed that this area during the time of Paul was not governed by a proconsul, but by an imperial legate. Thus, Acts was thought to be in error. What are the facts?

Cyprus, to which Paphos belonged, became a Senatorial province in 22 B.C. Therefore, from that date onward it was, at least throughout the time of the apostle Paul, governed by a proconsul. Thus, up until 22 B.C. it had been an Imperial province, and was ruled by a imperial legate (Robertson, LH, p. 182). But, at the time of Paul’s visit it was
a senatorial province and was governed by a proconsul. In fact, an inscription has been found at Soloi (in Cyprus) that states “in the Proconsulship of Paulus” (see Ramsay SPT, pp. 74-76). It is not my contention that this is necessarily the very Sergius Paulus of Acts 13, but merely that archaeological findings have confirmed that Luke used the correct title for the governor in Cyprus during the time of Paul’s missionary activity in this area (Thompson, LH, p.8). (For further study on this issue see Ramsay, BRD, pp. 150-172; and Thompson, BA, pp. 390-392.)

Recounting Paul’s arrest and imprisonment at Philippi in Acts 16:20-39, Luke calls the legal officials magistrates (Greek strategois or the Latin praetors), and their officers, sergeants (the Greek is rabdouchoi, and the Latin is lictors). Since, as noted earlier, Philippi was a Roman colony, its magistrates were called “duumvirs,” not praetors, which was a more dignified title. Again it seemed that Luke was incorrect. However, we know, of at least one parallel case from the Roman colony of Capua, where the “duumvirs” were, or at least preferred to be, called praetors
(Thompson, BA, p. 396; LH, p.14). Cicero writes: “Although they are called duumvirs in the other colonies, these men wish to be called praetors.” Therefore, it is possible, indeed highly probable given Luke’s usual precise and seemly firsthand information, that the Philippian magistrates did not use their official titles, but opted for the more respectable one (see Bruce, CBA, p. 335; Unger, ANT, p. 223).

Moving along we arrive at Thessalonica, and Paul’s run in with its authorities (Acts 17:6-9). Here, Luke calls the city officials politarchoi. Since this title is not found in any extant classical literature, it should come as no surprise that is was assumed that Acts had erred again. However, Act is correct (Sherwin-White, RSRL, p. 96-97). Inscriptions have been discovered, from Macedonian towns, including Thessaloncia, that verify Luke’s usage of this unusual term (see Bruce, ACNT, p.325). For example, the Roman road entered the city by a Roman arch called the Vardar Gate. On this arch is an inscription: “In the time of Politarchs….” The inscription is dated from 30 B.C. to 143 A.D. (Thompson, LH, p. 15).

From Acts 18:12 we read of Gallio, proconsul of Achaia, who Paul appeared before on spurious charges. It was believed that Luke was mistaken in referring to Gallio as a proconsul, since it was believed that Achaia at this time was governed by a procurator, not a proconsul. But, the literary and archaeological evidence supports Acts, not its critics. Achaia was governed by a proconsul from the time of 27 B.C. to 15 A.D. However, in 15 A.D. it reverted back to being under the control of the emperor; thus, it was governed by a procurator during this time period. Nonetheless, from 44 A.D. onwards it came again under the control of the Roman Senate, and thus was governed by a proconsul (see Ramsay, SPT, p. 258; Robertson, LH, p. 182; and Thompson, LH, p. 19).

Furthermore, the Gallio in question was the brother of the great Stoic philosopher, Seneca, who mentions that his brother “Gallio caught fever in Achaia” (Bruce, CBA, pp. 373-374; Thompson, LH, p. 19). Additionally, a Delphian inscription states a proclamation of emperor Claudius that Gallio became proconsul of Achaia in July, 51 A.D. (Bruce, ACNT, p. 324; CBA, p. 374; Thompson, BA, p. 401; LH, p. 19). This is remarkable confirmation of Luke’s accuracy in Acts 18:12., of not only stating the proper title of the governor, but the name of the actual person himself.

Next we want to examine Acts 19:31, 35, and 38. In these versus Luke mentions the “chief men,” or “officials (asiarchon), who were friends of Paul, the “town clerk” (grammateus), and Ephesus being the “temple keeper” or “guardian” (neokoros) of the temple of Artemis. All of these titles and offices have been verified by archaeological finds, namely, inscriptions, as having been used in Ephesus in the time frame that Paul journeyed to the city (see
Bruce, CBA, pp.400-402; NTDR, pp. 83-84; Sherwin-White, RSRL, pp. 85-91; Thompson, BA, p. 408; LH, p. 24-25).

In Acts 25:26 Festus is said to have applied the title of lord (kyrios) to the emperor. This was supposed to have been a blunder by Luke in attributing these words to Festus, since this title was not used for the emperor. Deissmann cites sources (pp. 351-354) that show that in fact the term was at times used for the Roman emperors in Paul’s days (and some before Paul’s time), even giving several parallel cases. One is where a Boeotian town referred to Nero as “lord of the whole world” (p. 354). This and other evidence for the usage of the term moved Deissmann to write:

The fact that a New Testament writer well acquainted with this period makes Festus the
Procurator speak of Nero simply as `the lord’ now acquires its full significance in this
connexion. The insignificant detail, questioned by various commentators, who, seated at
their writing-tables in Tubingen or Berlin, vainly imagined that they knew the period
better than St. Luke, now appears thoroughly credible. (p. 354.)

Lastly, we cite Acts 28:7. Luke calls the head official on the island of Malta, the “chief” or “first” (protos) official. This title is vouched for by both Greek and Latin inscriptions as the proper title for the Roman governor of Malta during this time period (Bruce, CBA, p. 523; Thompson, LH, p. 25).

Perhaps Luke’s accuracy in correctly naming religious and governmental officials can be better appreciated by citing two observations of Bruce:

The student of Roman history is aware of the bewildering variety in the titles held by these men, and he cannot fail to be struck by the confident accuracy with which Luke uses them. (ACNT, p. 325)

A writer who thus relates his story to the wider context of world history is courting trouble if he is not careful; he affords his critical readers so many opportunities for testing his accuracy. Luke takes this risk, and stands the test admirably. One of the most remarkable tokens of his accuracy is his sure familiarity with the proper titles of all the notable persons who are mentioned in his pages. This was by no means such an easy feat in his days as it is in ours, when it is so simple to consult convenient books of reference. The accuracy of Luke’s use of the various titles in the Roman Empire has been
compared to the ease and confident way in which an Oxford man in ordinary conversation will refer to the Heads of Oxford colleges by their proper titles–the Provost of Oriel, the Master of Balloil, the Rector of Exeter, the President of Magdalen, and so on…But Luke had a further difficulty in that the titles sometimes did not remain the same for any great length of time; a province might pass from senatorial
government to administration by a district representative of the emperor, and would then be governed no longer by a proconsul but by an imperial legate… (NTDR, p. 82).

Thus, to conclude this segment of our discussion and to bring into clearer relief the significance of Luke’s lucid and apparent eyewitness insights, it should be plain to see that Luke demonstrates in Acts a remarkable familiarity and accuracy in his appropriation of titles for various officials. (For further study consult Bruce, NTDR, pp. 82-83; and
Robertson, LH, p. 179-189.

Acts and History

Despite all the facts, all the details, attesting to the historical reliability and trustworthiness of Acts that we have seen in our survey, radical and moderate higher critics could (and some do) suggest two possibilities for this phenomena. First, the author(s) who wrote Acts late in the second century A.D. was not only a truly great writer and story teller who “breathed the breath of life” into his creation, but no doubt, was a world traveller (or the collective group of redactors were), and thus had access to the precise facts communicated to us relating to first century life via Acts.

Or, second, Acts was simply the result of a well educated redactor (or redactors) who possessed a wide breath of knowledge, and preformed a “cut and paste job” with the best oral and written traditions extant (form criticism), creating a literary master piece of church history and dogma.

However, even if we were to grant for the sake of argument either of these scenarios as being true, nonetheless, neither of them refutes the rock solid accuracy and historicity of the book of Acts. At worst even if he (they) only used early traditions, they were sound traditions; therefore, he presented us with first rate historical reporting. Either
scenario cannot explain away the plain facts. The information contained therein is reliable, and were possible, has been verified by external and objective evidence.

As plausible, consistent, and complete as these theories of Acts origin might seem (see Ramsay, SPT, p. 7-8), when Ockham’s razor is applied to them, they are cut into pieces They are possible but not probable. Indeed, they are extremely unlikely! To the point, why should we postulate elaborate and complex theories to account for the accuracy of Acts, when there is a much simpler explanation, and one that is in accord with history what the text itself states. Namely, Acts was written by Luke sometime in the first century. Those events to which he was not an eyewitness, he obtained reliable reports from those who themselves were (see e.g., Luke 1:1-3; Acts 1:1). Thus, since as we have seen, Acts is a trustworthy source, why should we “fly in the face” of the evidence and
postulate complex theories to explain this accuracy? Why propose a redactor or redactors in the late second century with this incredible and trustworthy knowledge, and such vivid accounts, and the claim to have been an eyewitness to many of the events described, and then at the same time propose that he (they) lied about being an eyewitness. This is go directly against what an otherwise trustworthy text states. This maneuvering is not only unnecessary, but wrong in view of the facts. The critical surgical edge of Ockham’s razor needs to be applied to the myopic vision of our higher critical patient to remove their improbable speculations and restore clear sight to see the facts correctly.

It is my belief that radical or moderate higher critical views of the book of Acts can only continue to be held by their adherents being ignorant of, or simply ignoring, the overwhelming archaeological, historical, and literary data that argues for the accuracy and early date of the writing of Acts.⁽²⁾ As such these views not only ignore the historical and literary evidence for Acts, but are pre-archaeological in orientation. That is, they derive form antiquated idealogies of
Hegelian religio-evolutionarism, and an anti-supernaturalistic world view, and not from archaeological investigation. They were formed before the development of modern archaeology, hence, are pre-archaeological. The modern theories have no such excuse, but simply survive because of sheer ignorance or blatant rejection of objective evidence for the sake of subjective speculations. Thus, higher critical view were and are built as W.F.
Albright stated “in der luft” (p. 29 ["in the air"]) on the dreams of arm chair theologians, and not the careful evaluations of archeological and literary informed historical-theological thinkers (see Gasque, SWRA, pp. 28, 61-63). Such
fanciful dreaming needs to be brought back to the ground by facts, cold hard archaeological facts.

In conclusion I submit that it has been reasonably demonstrated that the book of Acts is a reliable and trustworthy, indeed is quite a reliable and trustworthy, historical document. Therefore, grounded on the facts, the conclusions of moderate and radical higher critics are to be rejected because they are incorrect. Worse yet, they are touted as being the conclusions of learned, critical, and informed scholars, when in actuality their opinions are quite uninformed, uncritical, and naive. Thus, they are not to be accepted.

Acts should be respected and regarded as a first-rate work of history in the matters it speaks about, both theological and historical. It has been confirmed over and over again by independent and objective findings. To end our discussion we will appropriately let Sir William Ramsay have the last word:

The present writer takes the view that Luke’s history is unsurpassed in respect of its trustworthiness… You may press the words of Luke in a degree beyond any other historian’s. and they will stand the keenest scrutiny and the hardest treatment, provided always that the critic knows the subject and does not go beyond the limits of science and of justice…

…Acts may be quoted as a trustworthy historical authority….Luke is a historian of the first rank; not merely are his statements of fact trustworthy; he is possessed of the true historic sense; he fixes his mind on the idea and plan that rules in the evolution of history; and proportions the scale of his treatment to the importance of each incident. He seizes the important and critical events and shows their true nature at great length, while he touches lightly or omits entirely much that was valueless for his purposes. In short, this author should be placed along with the very greatest of historians. (BRD, pp.
81, 89, 222.)

Endnotes

 

Select Bibliography

After the bibliographical data will be found in parenthesis the abbreviated forms of the work’s titles referenced in the footnotes. The selections marked with an asterisk (*) at the end of the entrance are works actually consulted for this paper. The rest are listed because they are important references pertaining to the issues we have discussed, and thus are helpful for further study.

Albright, W.F. Eds. Vardaman, E. Jerry; Garrett, James Leo; and Adair, J.B.

1964 “Retrospect and Prospect in New Testament Archaeology.” THE TEACHER’S YOKE: STUDIES IN MEMORY OF HENRY TRANTHAM. Waco: Baylor University Press.*

Blaiklock, E.M. 1959 THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. London: Tyndale Press.

. Eds. Gasque, W.W., and Martin, Ralph P.

1970 “The Acts of the Apostles as a Document of First Century History.”
APOSTOLIC HISTORY AND THE GOSPEL: BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS PRESENTED TO F.F. BRUCE
ON HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co. pp. 41-54. (AADF) *

_______. 1979 THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
House. (ANT) *

Bruce, F.F. 1960 THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES: THE GREEK TEXT WITH INTRODUCTION AND
COMMENTARY. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. (AAGT)*

. Ed. Henry, Carl F.H. 1958 “Archaeological Confirmation of the New Testament.” REVELATION AND THE BIBLE. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. pp. 319-331. (ACNT) *

_______. 1979 COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF ACTS. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON THE
NEW TESTAMENT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co. (CBA) *

_______. 1978 THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCUMENTS: ARE THEY RELIABLE? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans
Publishing Co. Fifth revised edition. (NTDR) *

Cadbury, H.J. 1955 THE BOOK OF ACTS IN HISTORY. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Deissmann, Adolf. Trans. Strachan, Lionel. 1980 LIGHT FROM THE ANCIENT EAST. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House; German edition, 1978.*

Foakes Jackson, F.J., Lake, Kirsopp, Cadbury, H.J., eds.

1920-1933 THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY. 5 Vol. London: Macmillan Co.

Gasque, W.W. 1969 “The Historical Value of the Book of Acts.” EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY, XLI., 1969. pp. 69-88. (HVBC)*

_______. 1967 SIR WILLIAM M. RAMSAY: ARCHAEOLOGIST AND NEW TESTAMENT SCHOLAR. Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House. (SWMR) *

Harnack, A.(br> 1911 DATE OF THE ACTS AND OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. London. German edition, 1911.

Hengel, Martin. Trans. Bowden, John. 1985 ACTS AND THE HISTORY OF EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY. Philadelphia: Fortress Press; German edition, 1979. (AHEC) *

. Trans. Bowden, John. 1983 BETWEEN JESUS AND PAUL. Philadelphia: Fortress Press; German edition, 1983. (BJP) *

Marshall, I.H. 1978 THE GOSPEL OF LUKE, A COMMENTARY ON THE GREEK TEXT. Exeter:
Paternoster Press.

_______. 1982 LUKE: HISTORIAN AND THEOLOGIAN. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House

Metzger, Bruce 1956 ST. PAUL’S JOURNEYS IN THE GREEK ORIENT. London: SCM.

Montgomery, John W. 1976 HISTORY AND CHRISTIANITY. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.*

Ramsay, Sir William M. 1979 THE BEARING OF RECENT DISCOVERY ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. Reprinted from the 1915 edition. (BRD)
*

_______. 1979 THE CITIES OF ST. PAUL: THEIR INFLUENCE ON HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. Reprinted from the 1907 edition. (CSP) *

_______. 1979 A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL’S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. Reprinted from the 1900 edition.

_______. 1979 LUKE THE PHYSICIAN AND OTHER STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. Reprinted from the 1908 edition. (LP) *

_______. 1979 PAULINE AND OTHER STUDIES IN THE EARLY CHURCH HISTORY. Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House. Reprinted from the 1906 edition. (POS) *

_______. 1979 ST. PAUL THE TRAVELLER AND ROMAN CITIZEN. Grand Rapids: Baker Book house.
Reprinted from the 1897 edition. (SPT) *

Robertson, A.T. 1920 LUKE THE HISTORIAN IN THE LIGHT OF RESEARCH. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. (LH) *

Sherwin-White, A.N. 1978 ROMAN SOCIETY AND ROMAN LAW IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. (RSRL) *

. Ed. Nineham, D.E. 1965 “The Trial of Christ.” HISTORICITY AND CHRONOLOGY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. London: S.P.C.K. pp. 97-116. (TC) *

Smith, James. 1880 THE VOYAGE AND SHIPWRECK OF ST. PAUL. London. (VSSP) *

Stonehouse, N.B. 1957 PAUL BEFORE THE AREOPAGUS: AND OTHER NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957.

Thompson, J.A. 1987 THE BIBLE AND ARCHAEOLOGY. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co, Third edition. (LH)*

_______. 1954 LUKE THE HISTORIAN. Melbourne: The Australian Institute of Archaeology. (BA) *

Unger, Merill. 1962 ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE NEW TESTAMENT. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House. (ANT) *

Van Elderen, Bastiaan. Eds. Gasque, W.W., and Martin, Ralph P. 1970 “Some Archaeological Observations on Paul’s First Missionary Journey.” APOSTOLIC HISTORY AND THE GOSPEL: BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS PRESENTED TO F.F. BRUCE ON HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co. PP. 151-161.*

Wilson, Clifford A. 1977 ROCKS, RELICS AND BIBLICAL RELIABILITY. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House.*

Yamauchi, Edwin. 1981 THE STONES AND THE SCRIPTURES: AN INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. (SS)*